[main]: document authentik

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schema_version: 1
id: home-server.authentication
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, authelia, forward-auth, secrets]
scope: [jupiter, authentik, oidc, forward-auth, access-groups, secrets]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-06"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-16"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Deployed Authelia file matches repository; Portainer supplies environment variables, 2026-10-06"
reference: "Authentik fully deployed, all listed app integrations complete and Authelia retired; OIDC and three-group motivation, 2026-10-16"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Portainer state added to Backrest plan, 2026-10-06"
reference: "Six-directory Backrest plan including Authentik and Wardrowbe; deployed Authentik container names confirmed, 2026-10-16"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "All stack environment values/secrets managed in Portainer; GitHub access uses PAT, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "No independent credential recovery except restic key, 2026-10-06"
reference: "Independent credential recovery unchanged: only restic key has independent custody, 2026-10-16"
- kind: repository
repository: jupiter-stacks
revision: 610e325ef6a98850511ce7a089b0b9a77bfecf15
revision: d09df456ad331b8beb9a40615114ea8aae2dced5
paths:
- stacks/authelia/configuration.yml
- stacks/authelia/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/authentik/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml
- stacks/authentik/.env.example
- stacks/beszel/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/dozzle/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/gitea/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/immich/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/paperless-ngx/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/portainer/portainer_start.sh
- stacks/wardrowbe/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/backrest/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/notes/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/prowlarr/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/radarr/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/sonarr/docker-compose.yml
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.networking, home-server.portainer, home-server.backups, home-server.deployment]
update_triggers: [access-policy-change, authentication-change, secret-rotation, middleware-change]
unknowns:
- authelia-file-placeholder-expansion-mechanism
- deployed-group-memberships
- per-application-local-login-and-account-linking-settings
- retired-authelia-data-retention
---
# Authentication
Authentik replaces Authelia. The owner wanted native OIDC rather than only
forward-auth, with three access groups separating server administration,
development tools and client-facing services. The owner reports the migration
fully deployed, all integrations below complete and Authelia retired.
Configuration details below are repository evidence, not live inspection.
| Component | Configuration |
| --- | --- |
| Portal | `https://auth.umbra.mom` |
| Backend | File `/config/users_database.yml`; Argon2id |
| Second factor | TOTP; issuer `Jupiter` |
| Policy | Default deny; listed domains require `two_factor` |
| Session cookie domain | `umbra.mom` |
| Default redirect | `https://sonarr.umbra.mom` |
| Storage | SQLite `/data/db.sqlite3`; storage encryption key |
| Notifications | Filesystem `/data/notification.txt` |
| Identity service | Authentik server + worker; image `2026.8.4` |
| Database | PostgreSQL 16; database/user `authentik` |
| Configuration | `stacks/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml`; worker-mounted custom blueprint |
| Application MFA | `jupiter-app-authorization`; TOTP or WebAuthn; prompts for setup if none configured |
| Recent MFA | Five-minute reuse threshold avoids an immediate duplicate challenge |
| Host setup access | Loopback `127.0.0.1:9000` -> server `9000` |
Two-factor domains: `sonarr`, `radarr`, `prowlarr`, `logs`, `notes`, `backups`
under `umbra.mom`.
## Access groups
## Enforcement
Owner terminology maps to the blueprint's exact group names:
Protected routers attach `authelia@docker`:
| Intended group | Authentik group | Purpose / applications |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Admin | `admins` | Owner only; server health/operations: Backrest, Beszel, Dozzle, Notes, Prowlarr, Radarr, Sonarr |
| Developers | `development` | Development services: Gitea, Portainer |
| Clients | `clients` | Useful end-user services: Immich, Paperless, Wardrowbe |
Each application has an enabled group binding; `policy_engine_mode: all`;
binding failure result is false. All three groups have `is_superuser: false`:
`admins` application access is not Authentik superuser status.
No group hierarchy or membership assignment is declared by this blueprint.
Membership in `admins` alone does not grant the development/client applications;
users needing multiple categories need the corresponding memberships.
Actual deployed membership assignments were not supplied.
## Native OIDC
Each client uses a confidential authorization-code provider, strict redirect URIs,
per-provider issuer and the shared application-MFA authorization flow.
Issuer pattern: `https://auth.umbra.mom/application/o/<client-id>/`.
| Client ID | Application hostname | Integration configuration |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `beszel` | `beszel.umbra.mom` | Database/UI provider; password-auth disable flag in Compose |
| `dozzle` | `logs.umbra.mom` | Compose OIDC settings; no forward-auth middleware |
| `gitea` | `gitea.umbra.mom` | Database/UI authentication source; Compose requires login for account linking and disables automatic registration |
| `immich` | `photos.umbra.mom` | Database/UI OAuth settings; web and mobile callbacks registered |
| `paperless` | `paperless.umbra.mom` | Compose OpenID Connect/allauth configuration; PKCE enabled; signups disabled |
| `portainer` | `portainer.umbra.mom`, `portainer.local.umbra.mom` | Database/UI OAuth settings; both callback hosts registered |
| `wardrowbe` | `wardrobe.umbra.mom` | Compose OIDC settings for frontend and backend/workers |
Dozzle's custom profile mapping emits `dozzle_roles: ["none"]` for `admins`
members and `[]` otherwise; application access is separately restricted to
`admins`. The email mapping asserts `email_verified` only when the user has
an email and their `email_verified` attribute is explicitly true.
OIDC integration does not prove local password login is disabled or application
roles are synchronized. Beszel and Paperless retain migration-safe local-login
defaults in Compose; deployed overrides and account-linking details were not
supplied. Application permissions and existing sessions remain app-managed.
## Forward-auth
Backrest (`backups.umbra.mom`), Notes, Prowlarr, Radarr and Sonarr retain
proxy-based protection. Their routers attach `authentik@docker`:
```text
Traefik -> http://authelia:9091/api/authz/forward-auth
Traefik -> http://authentik-server:9000/outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/traefik
```
`trustForwardHeader=true`; response headers:
`Remote-User, Remote-Groups, Remote-Email, Remote-Name`.
The embedded outpost serves five `forward_single` providers, each with an
explicit external host and empty `skip_path_regex`. A priority-1000 router
on those hosts sends `/outpost.goauthentik.io/` directly to Authentik,
bypassing forward-auth so callbacks can complete.
Policy applies only to requests routed through forward-auth. It is not a
global gate for every service or directly published port.
`trustForwardHeader=true`; forwarded response headers:
## Configuration / secrets
```text
X-authentik-username, X-authentik-groups, X-authentik-entitlements,
X-authentik-email, X-authentik-name, X-authentik-uid, X-authentik-jwt,
X-authentik-meta-jwks, X-authentik-meta-outpost, X-authentik-meta-provider,
X-authentik-meta-app, X-authentik-meta-version
```
Host `/data/authelia/{configuration.yml,users_database.yml}` mounts read-only
under `/config`; `/data/authelia` also mounts read-write at `/data`.
Forward-auth applies only to attached routers. Authentik is not a global gate
for every service, directly published port, SSH connection or API token.
## State / secrets
| Host path | Container use |
| --- | --- |
| `/data/authentik/postgres` | PostgreSQL `/var/lib/postgresql/data`; identity, policy and MFA state |
| `/data/authentik/data` | Server + worker `/data`; persistent files |
| `/data/authentik/blueprints` | Worker `/blueprints/custom:ro`; host copy of repository blueprint |
Stack variable overrides/secrets are managed in Portainer; Compose retains
non-secret configuration. Authelia environment:
non-secret configuration. Required Authentik stack secrets:
```text
AUTHELIA_SESSION_SECRET
AUTHELIA_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
AUTHELIA_IDENTITY_VALIDATION_RESET_PASSWORD_JWT_SECRET
AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY
AUTHENTIK_DB_PASSWORD
OIDC_BESZEL_SECRET
OIDC_DOZZLE_SECRET
OIDC_GITEA_SECRET
OIDC_IMMICH_SECRET
OIDC_PAPERLESS_SECRET
OIDC_PORTAINER_SECRET
OIDC_WARDROWBE_SECRET
```
Checked-in YAML also contains `${AUTHELIA_*}` placeholders. Container environment
injection alone does not prove mounted-file substitution; expansion mechanism
unconfirmed.
Client secrets are independently generated plaintext credentials, not old
Authelia password hashes. The worker passes them to blueprint `!Env` entries.
Keep each provider secret matched to its application configuration:
Dozzle uses `DOZZLE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`, Paperless
`PAPERLESS_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`, and Wardrowbe `WARDROWBE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`.
Other clients store provider configuration in their databases/UIs.
Authelia data remains outside the supplied backup plan.
[Portainer state](portainer.md) is covered; secret recovery remains untested.
No independent recovery arrangement exists for stack secrets.
Public Traefik routing defaults off (`AUTHENTIK_PUBLIC_ROUTING=false`) for
private initial setup; enable only after securing the administrator account.
The owner reports public deployment complete; this default is not deployed state.
See [deployment](deployment.md) for the configuration surfaces and order.
`/data/authentik` and [Portainer state](portainer.md) are included in
[Backrest](backups.md). Backups stop Authentik server/worker and PostgreSQL;
new OIDC logins and forward-auth access are unavailable during that stop.
Recovery remains untested, with no independent admin/MFA or stack-secret
recovery arrangement; only the restic key has independent custody.
Retention/deletion of retired `/data/authelia` data is unconfirmed.
GitHub repository access uses a PAT; host SSH keys and tunnel credential files
are separate from stack environment variables.
+39 -9
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ id: home-server.backups
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, backrest, restic, google-drive, recovery]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-06"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-16"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Backrest plan JSON, destination, key custody and no restore test, 2026-10-06"
@@ -12,14 +12,18 @@ sources:
reference: "Updated four-service Backrest plan and deployed Portainer bind mount/container name, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Only restic key has independent custody; no independent credential recovery or backup/restore evidence, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Updated six-directory Backrest plan including Authentik and Wardrowbe, deployed Authentik hook container names confirmed; independent recovery custody unchanged, 2026-10-16"
- kind: repository
repository: jupiter-stacks
revision: 610e325ef6a98850511ce7a089b0b9a77bfecf15
revision: d09df456ad331b8beb9a40615114ea8aae2dced5
paths:
- stacks/backrest/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/gitea/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/paperless-ngx/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/vaultwarden/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/authentik/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/wardrowbe/docker-compose.yml
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.storage, home-server.portainer, home-server.authentication, home-server.operations]
update_triggers: [backup-plan-change, destination-change, hook-change, credential-change, restore-test]
unknowns:
@@ -47,19 +51,24 @@ Backrest bind-mounts host `/data` at container `/userdata:ro`.
| Host source | Plan path |
| --- | --- |
| `/data/authentik` | `/userdata/authentik` |
| `/data/gitea` | `/userdata/gitea` |
| `/data/paperless-ngx` | `/userdata/paperless-ngx` |
| `/data/portainer` | `/userdata/portainer` |
| `/data/vaultwarden` | `/userdata/vaultwarden` |
| `/data/wardrowbe` | `/userdata/wardrowbe` |
Case-insensitive exclusion: `/userdata/gitea/gitea/packages`.
Case-insensitive exclusions: `/userdata/gitea/gitea/packages`,
`/userdata/wardrowbe/redis`.
`excludes: []`; CLI `--skip-if-unchanged` supplied despite
plan `skipIfUnchanged: false`. Unchanged runs may create no snapshot.
## Consistency hooks
Stop timeout `120s`; chains use `&&`. Errors: `ON_ERROR_FATAL`,
except Portainer restart (`ON_ERROR_IGNORE`).
except Portainer, Wardrowbe and Authentik restart hooks (`ON_ERROR_IGNORE`).
Rows below group the supplied hooks by service; the plan lists Wardrowbe's
hooks before Authentik's.
| Event | Ordered commands / containers |
| --- | --- |
@@ -71,11 +80,29 @@ except Portainer restart (`ON_ERROR_IGNORE`).
| `SNAPSHOT_END`, `SNAPSHOT_ERROR` | Start `gitea_db` -> `gitea` -> `gitea_runner` |
| `SNAPSHOT_END`, `ANY_ERROR` | Start `vaultwarden` |
| `SNAPSHOT_END`, `SNAPSHOT_ERROR` | Start `portainer`; ignore hook failure |
| `SNAPSHOT_START` | Stop `wardrowbe-frontend`, `wardrowbe-backend`, `wardrowbe-worker`, `wardrowbe-image-worker` in one command -> stop `wardrowbe-postgres`, `wardrowbe-redis` |
| `SNAPSHOT_END`, `SNAPSHOT_ERROR` | Start `wardrowbe-postgres`, `wardrowbe-redis` -> wait for PostgreSQL and Redis -> start backend, worker, image-worker, frontend; ignore hook failure |
| `SNAPSHOT_START` | Stop `authentik-server`, `authentik-worker` in one command -> stop `authentik-postgresql` |
| `SNAPSHOT_END`, `SNAPSHOT_ERROR` | Start `authentik-postgresql` -> wait for PostgreSQL -> start `authentik-server`, `authentik-worker`; ignore hook failure |
Cold filesystem copies of applications/databases; no database dumps supplied.
Broker stays running. `docker start` does not wait for database readiness.
Hook failure can leave services stopped; recovery is not demonstrated.
Portainer restart failure does not fail the backup operation.
Paperless broker stays running. Paperless/Gitea restart chains use `docker start`
without waiting for database readiness.
Wardrowbe waits inside the containers using `pg_isready -U wardrowbe -d wardrowbe`
then `redis-cli ping`; Authentik uses `pg_isready -U authentik -d authentik`.
These are `until` loops with two-second sleeps and no explicit deadline in the
commands. Starting multiple application containers in one command does not
establish application readiness or dependency ordering.
The owner confirms the three Authentik hook names match deployed containers.
Repository Compose explicitly names only `authentik-server`; worker/database
names must be preserved or the hooks updated when recreating the stack.
Hook failure can leave services stopped; Portainer, Wardrowbe and Authentik
restart failures do not fail the backup operation. Authentik downtime also
interrupts new OIDC logins and proxy-protected access, including the Backrest UI.
Application readiness and recovery are not demonstrated by the plan.
## Backrest state
@@ -90,8 +117,11 @@ Portainer restart failure does not fail the backup operation.
## Recovery limits
Only the four listed directories are covered. No supplied coverage for Authelia,
Traefik, Backrest configuration, Docker named volumes, OS, or Mercury.
Only the six listed directories are covered, subject to the exclusions above.
Authentik identity/MFA state and Wardrowbe PostgreSQL/uploads are included;
Wardrowbe Redis is excluded. SSD-backed Wardrowbe model/cache paths are outside
the plan. No supplied coverage for Traefik, Backrest configuration, Docker named
volumes, OS, or Mercury. Authelia is retired; old data retention is unconfirmed.
Full-host recovery requires independently retrievable repository credentials,
configuration and restic key. Key custody alone does not establish recoverability.
+40 -1
View File
@@ -4,12 +4,25 @@ id: home-server.deployment
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, portainer, github, stack-deployment, secrets]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-06"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-16"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Portainer GitHub/main/PAT configuration, environment management and manual pull/redeploy workflow, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "No independent credential recovery; operational rules not established, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Authentik fully deployed with all listed application integrations; Authelia retired; independent recovery custody unchanged, 2026-10-16"
- kind: repository
repository: jupiter-stacks
revision: d09df456ad331b8beb9a40615114ea8aae2dced5
paths:
- stacks/authentik/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml
- stacks/authentik/.env.example
- stacks/beszel/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/gitea/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/immich/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/paperless-ngx/docker-compose.yml
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.host, home-server.portainer, home-server.authentication, home-server.backups, home-server.operations]
update_triggers: [deployment-workflow-change, repository-change, credential-rotation, rollback-policy-change]
unknowns:
@@ -44,5 +57,31 @@ No independent recovery arrangement exists for the PAT or stack secrets.
Rollback, health-check gates, approval rules and UI-versus-Git drift policy
are not established; do not assume permission to deploy, stop or delete services.
## Authentik configuration surfaces
The owner reports the Authelia-to-Authentik migration complete. Rebuilding it
requires more than pulling Compose:
| Surface | Required state |
| --- | --- |
| Portainer environment | Authentik persistent key, database password, seven provider client secrets; matching application secrets/overrides |
| Host files | Copy repository `stacks/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml` into `/data/authentik/blueprints`; Git checkout alone does not populate this bind mount |
| Authentik database | Administrator, MFA enrolment, group memberships, applied providers/application policies |
| Application databases/UIs | Beszel, Gitea, Immich and Portainer OIDC setup/account linking |
| Application Compose | Dozzle, Paperless and Wardrowbe OIDC settings; five proxy-protected routers use `authentik@docker` |
For initial setup, keep `AUTHENTIK_PUBLIC_ROUTING=false` and access the
loopback-published `127.0.0.1:9000` privately, for example through SSH forwarding.
Secure the administrator account and prepare MFA, groups and blueprint policy
before enabling public routing. Enable routing and establish working OIDC
account links before disabling any local application login; Beszel/Paperless
flags default to preserving it. The retired Authelia service is not a
replacement recovery path.
Redeploying the Authentik stack alone does not copy changed host blueprints
or reproduce database-backed application settings. Keep provider/client secrets
matched across both sides. Preserve deployed Authentik container names or update
the [Backrest hooks](backups.md) when recreating containers.
Host apt packages, fstab, RAID assembly, systemd units and Mercury nginx are
outside the Compose deployment workflow.
+4 -2
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,12 @@ id: home-server.reference
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, mercury, seedbox, shared-infrastructure]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-06"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-16"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Owner interview, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Authentik migration, access-group motivation and six-directory backup plan, 2026-10-16"
related:
- home-server.host
- home-server.mercury
@@ -35,7 +37,7 @@ unknowns: []
| [Operations / decisions](operations.md) | Tradeoffs; monitoring; recovery gaps |
| [Networking](networking.md) | Mercury; WireGuard; DNS; ingress |
| [Storage](storage.md) | SSD; RAID 0; mounts; volumes |
| [Authentication](authentication.md) | Authelia; policy; secrets |
| [Authentication](authentication.md) | Authentik; OIDC; access groups; forward-auth; secrets |
| [Backups](backups.md) | Backrest; coverage; retention; recovery |
## Evidence / agent contract
+71 -5
View File
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
schema_version: 1
id: home-server.networking
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, mercury, dns, ingress, wireguard, cloudflare]
scope: [jupiter, mercury, seedbox, dns, ingress, wireguard, cloudflare, sftp]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-06"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-16"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Network topology, Mercury nginx/iptables/fail2ban output, LAN DNS, 2026-10-06"
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ sources:
reference: "Cloudflare ingress YAML and client SSH configurations, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "CGNAT rationale, Docker network and container inspection, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Ultra.cc hostname, qBittorrent UI, SFTP rclone remote/systemd unit and Radarr/Sonarr bind mounts, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Authentik fully deployed with all listed app integrations and Authelia retired, 2026-10-16"
- kind: repository
repository: jupiter-stacks
revision: 610e325ef6a98850511ce7a089b0b9a77bfecf15
@@ -21,19 +25,26 @@ sources:
- stacks/gitea/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/jellyfin/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/audiobookshelf/docker-compose.yml
- kind: repository
repository: jupiter-stacks
revision: d09df456ad331b8beb9a40615114ea8aae2dced5
paths:
- stacks/authentik/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.host, home-server.mercury, home-server.seedbox, home-server.authentication, home-server.operations]
update_triggers: [dns-change, proxy-change, tunnel-change, firewall-change, certificate-change]
update_triggers: [dns-change, proxy-change, tunnel-change, firewall-change, certificate-change, seedbox-change]
unknowns:
- public-dns-record-types-and-cloudflare-proxy-status
- cloudflare-access-applications-and-login-policies
- wireguard-allowedips-and-keepalive
- jupiter-firewall-policy
- traefik-forwarded-header-trust-configuration
- seedbox-sftp-port-and-download-client-api-endpoint
---
# Networking
## HTTPS ingress
## HTTPS ingress / seedbox connectivity
```mermaid
---
@@ -66,16 +77,28 @@ flowchart TB
LAN["<b>LAN clients</b><br/>Jellyfin / Bookshelf local DNS"]
Traefik["<b>Traefik</b><br/>192.168.1.56<br/>WireGuard 10.0.0.2"]
Apps["<b>Application containers</b><br/>Docker network: traefik"]
Arr["<b>Radarr / Sonarr</b><br/>Download control / media imports"]
Rclone["<b>Host rclone / FUSE</b><br/>/mnt/seedbox"]
LAN -->|"HTTPS :443"| Traefik
Traefik -->|"Application routing"| Apps
Traefik -->|"Media management UIs"| Arr
Arr -->|"/downloads bind / host /mnt/seedbox"| Rclone
end
subgraph Seed["ULTRA.CC / SEEDBOX"]
Qbit["<b>qBittorrent</b><br/>jayo60013.terra.usbx.me"]
Downloads["<b>Remote download storage</b><br/>terra.usbx.me<br/>downloads/qbittorrent"]
Qbit -->|"Writes downloads"| Downloads
end
Internet -->|"HTTPS :443"| Nginx
Nginx -->|"HTTPS :443 over WireGuard"| Traefik
Arr -->|"qBittorrent API / endpoint unconfirmed"| Qbit
Rclone -->|"Outbound SFTP / remote file access"| Downloads
class Internet,LAN infraClient
class Nginx,Traefik infraEdge
class Apps,Uptime infraService
class Apps,Uptime,Arr,Rclone,Qbit,Downloads infraService
```
## Cloudflare Tunnel
@@ -162,6 +185,28 @@ Ingress source: host `/data/cloudflared/config.yaml`, mounted at
| `bookshelf.local.umbra.mom` | Jupiter `192.168.1.56` |
| `ssh.umbra.mom`, `git.umbra.mom` | Cloudflare Tunnel |
| `uptime.umbra.mom` | Mercury nginx -> `http://127.0.0.1:3001` |
| `terra.usbx.me` | Ultra.cc seedbox; rclone SFTP remote |
| `jayo60013.terra.usbx.me` | Provider-hosted qBittorrent UI under `/qbittorrent/` |
## Seedbox connection
The [Ultra.cc seedbox](seedbox.md) runs qBittorrent on `terra.usbx.me`, separate
from Jupiter and Mercury. Its provider-hosted UI is
<https://jayo60013.terra.usbx.me/qbittorrent/>.
Jupiter's host-level `rclone-seedbox.service` initiates an outbound SFTP
connection to `terra.usbx.me`, user `jayo60013`, using
`/home/jay/.ssh/id_ed25519`. Remote `seedbox:downloads/qbittorrent` is exposed
through FUSE at `/mnt/seedbox`, then bind-mounted at `/downloads` in Radarr
and Sonarr. File reads use this mount; download control/removal uses qBittorrent's
API, not deletion through rclone. The exact configured download-client API
endpoint and SFTP port were not supplied; do not infer them from the UI URL.
This is not a WebDAV mount, scheduled sync, or Mercury/WireGuard/Cloudflare
Tunnel ingress route. No home-router port forwarding is required for Jupiter's
outbound SFTP connection. Remote availability and the host mount are dependencies
for media imports; startup ordering relative to Docker remains unconfirmed.
See [Storage](storage.md) for remote versus local media placement.
## Mercury
@@ -201,3 +246,24 @@ whether they are obsolete or safe to remove.
- HTTPS fallback: priority `1`; unmatched non-apex hosts redirect to `https://umbra.mom`.
- `cloudflared`: `/data/cloudflared` -> `/etc/cloudflared`;
stack-local bridge `cloudflare`; no published ports.
## Authentication routing
[Authentik](authentication.md) serves `auth.umbra.mom` through Traefik to
`authentik-server:9000`; the server joins the external `traefik` network.
The ingress diagrams show transport, not a universal authentication gate.
Seven applications use native OIDC; Backrest, Notes, Prowlarr, Radarr and Sonarr
use Traefik middleware `authentik@docker` and the embedded outpost.
Dozzle (`logs.umbra.mom`) now uses OIDC, not forward-auth.
On the five proxy-protected hostnames, a priority-1000
`/outpost.goauthentik.io/` route goes straight to Authentik without forward-auth
to handle callbacks. Other application requests use their normal routers.
The middleware trusts forwarded headers; this is not evidence that the wider
Mercury/Traefik forwarded-header trust chain is configured.
Authentik also publishes `127.0.0.1:9000` for private host access.
Repository-defined networks (not part of the older observed-network snapshot):
`authentik-data` is internal and connects PostgreSQL, server and worker;
the worker also joins `authentik-egress`. The server's additional `traefik`
attachment means the internal data network is not complete egress isolation.
+20 -6
View File
@@ -4,17 +4,19 @@ id: home-server.operations
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, mercury, design-decisions, monitoring, recovery]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-06"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-16"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "RAID/media tradeoff, CGNAT/public IPv4 rationale, no alerting and running monitoring/log containers, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Outages over one day catastrophic; no independent credentials except restic key, recovery evidence, host-config archive or operational rules, 2026-10-06"
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.host, home-server.mercury, home-server.networking, home-server.storage, home-server.backups, home-server.deployment]
- kind: owner-report
reference: "OIDC and three-group motivation; Authentik fully deployed and Authelia retired; updated six-directory backup plan; independent recovery custody unchanged, 2026-10-16"
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.host, home-server.mercury, home-server.networking, home-server.storage, home-server.authentication, home-server.backups, home-server.deployment]
update_triggers: [data-priority-change, architecture-change, alerting-change, recovery-test]
unknowns:
- acceptable-data-loss-and-recovery-order-by-service
- data-criticality-outside-the-four-backed-up-directories
- data-criticality-outside-the-six-backed-up-directories
- tested-full-host-recovery-order
- monitoring-review-frequency
---
@@ -26,14 +28,21 @@ unknowns:
| Decision | Reason / accepted tradeoff |
| --- | --- |
| RAID 0 for HDD data | Capacity prioritized over disk redundancy; downloaded media can be reacquired |
| Back up important state | Four application directories covered; media redundancy is not the objective |
| Back up important state | Six application directories covered, subject to exclusions; media redundancy is not the objective |
| Mercury public edge | Static public IPv4; home ISP uses CGNAT |
| No residential public ingress | Owner preference to avoid exposing the home IP |
| Authentik instead of Authelia | Native OIDC rather than only forward-auth; retain forward-auth where needed |
| Three access categories | Admin: owner only, server health/operations; Developers: development services such as Gitea/Portainer; Clients: useful end-user services such as Wardrowbe/Paperless |
RAID 0 still stores important state alongside media: either HDD failure loses
the array; recovery depends on working backups. Owner intent is not evidence
that every important dataset is covered.
The Authentik migration is complete by owner report; Authelia is retired.
Exact repository group names, app assignments and MFA policy are in
[Authentication](authentication.md). Group access is not the same as application
administrator privileges or Authentik superuser status.
## Observability
| Facility | Current configuration |
@@ -44,6 +53,9 @@ that every important dataset is covered.
Monitoring does not imply notification delivery. Backup-hook failures,
stopped services and storage failures require manual detection.
The backup plan stops Authentik, interrupting new OIDC logins and forward-auth
access. Authentik/Wardrowbe restart hooks ignore errors, so backup completion
alone does not establish that authentication or applications recovered.
## Recovery status
@@ -58,8 +70,10 @@ stopped services and storage failures require manual detection.
| Independent host-config archive | Not maintained |
| Operational rules / rollback policy | Not established |
Backup scope is documented in [Backups](backups.md). The four-directory plan
does not establish OS, host-configuration or named-volume recovery.
Backup scope is documented in [Backups](backups.md). The six-directory plan now
includes Authentik identity/MFA state and Wardrowbe data, but does not establish
OS, broader host-configuration or named-volume recovery. There is still no
independent Authentik admin/MFA or stack-secret recovery arrangement.
## Proposed recovery storage
+20 -5
View File
@@ -4,18 +4,20 @@ id: home-server.portainer
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, portainer, deployment, configuration-state]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-06"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-16"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Deployed container, ~/portainer_start.sh and updated Backrest plan, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "GitHub main/PAT access, Portainer environment values, manual redeployment and container inspection, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Authentik fully deployed with all listed app integrations, including Portainer, 2026-10-16"
- kind: repository
repository: jupiter-stacks
revision: working-tree
base_revision: 610e325ef6a98850511ce7a089b0b9a77bfecf15
revision: d09df456ad331b8beb9a40615114ea8aae2dced5
paths:
- stacks/portainer/portainer_start.sh
- stacks/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.storage, home-server.authentication, home-server.backups, home-server.deployment]
update_triggers: [script-change, portainer-upgrade, state-migration, backup-plan-change]
unknowns: [local-hostname-dns-resolution, successful-state-and-secret-restore]
@@ -43,8 +45,21 @@ Reference script: [portainer_start.sh](https://github.com/jayo60013/jupiter-stac
Script stops/removes the existing container, then recreates it; bind-mounted
state persists. Requires Docker, the `traefik` network, and mounted `/data`.
Supplied routers attach no Authelia middleware. Local router does not establish
local DNS resolution.
Supplied routers attach no forward-auth middleware. Local router does not
establish local DNS resolution.
## Authentication
Native OIDC through [Authentik](authentication.md); client ID `portainer`;
issuer `https://auth.umbra.mom/application/o/portainer/`.
Both public and local HTTPS hostnames are registered as strict callbacks.
Application access requires Authentik group `development` (owner's Developers
category); this does not itself assign Portainer administrator permissions.
OAuth configuration is database/UI state, not configured by the container
startup script. The owner reports the integration complete; local-login and
account-linking settings were not supplied. Preserve `/data/portainer` for
both stack management and authentication configuration.
## Stack management
+57 -10
View File
@@ -2,28 +2,31 @@
schema_version: 1
id: home-server.storage
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, disks, raid, filesystems, docker-volumes]
scope: [jupiter, seedbox, disks, raid, filesystems, docker-volumes, remote-storage]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-06"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-16"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "lsblk filesystem output, RAID level, mount placement and Docker data root, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Seedbox rclone mount and systemd unit, 2026-10-06"
reference: "Ultra.cc plan/capacity, seedbox rclone mount/systemd unit and Radarr/Sonarr bind-mount inspection, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Deployed Portainer uses /data/portainer bind mount, not portainer_data, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "mdstat, mdadm scans/detail, fstab, findmnt and Docker volume/container inspection, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Authentik deployed, Authelia retired; six-directory backup plan includes Authentik and Wardrowbe, 2026-10-16"
- kind: repository
repository: jupiter-stacks
revision: 610e325ef6a98850511ce7a089b0b9a77bfecf15
revision: d09df456ad331b8beb9a40615114ea8aae2dced5
paths:
- stacks/backrest/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/jellyfin/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/authelia/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/authentik/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/wardrowbe/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/traefik/docker-compose.yml
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.host, home-server.seedbox, home-server.portainer, home-server.backups, home-server.operations]
update_triggers: [disk-change, raid-change, mount-change, volume-change, backup-coverage-change]
update_triggers: [disk-change, raid-change, mount-change, volume-change, backup-coverage-change, seedbox-change]
unknowns: [persistent-mdadm-config-and-initramfs-content, disk-health]
---
@@ -36,6 +39,7 @@ config:
.node rect { rx: 8px; ry: 8px; stroke-width: 1.5px; }
.cluster rect { fill: var(--infra-zone) !important; stroke: var(--infra-border) !important; stroke-dasharray: 5 5; rx: 12px; ry: 12px; }
.label, .nodeLabel, .cluster-label { color: var(--infra-text) !important; }
.edgeLabel, .edgeLabel p { background-color: var(--infra-zone) !important; color: var(--infra-text) !important; }
.flowchart-link { stroke: var(--infra-line) !important; }
marker path { fill: var(--infra-line) !important; stroke: var(--infra-line) !important; }
.infraStorage rect, .infraStorage path { fill: var(--infra-storage-fill) !important; stroke: var(--infra-storage-stroke) !important; }
@@ -48,6 +52,16 @@ config:
rankSpacing: 45
---
flowchart LR
subgraph Remote["ULTRA.CC / SEEDBOX"]
SEED[("<b>terra.usbx.me</b><br/>1001 GB allocation<br/>downloads/qbittorrent")]
end
subgraph Import["JUPITER / REMOTE MEDIA IMPORT"]
MOUNT["<b>/mnt/seedbox</b><br/>rclone / SFTP / FUSE<br/>Not a local replica"]
ARR["<b>Radarr / Sonarr</b><br/>Container /downloads"]
MOUNT -->|"Bind-mounted download source"| ARR
end
subgraph Array["HDD ARRAY / APPLICATION DATA"]
direction TB
A["<b>Seagate BarraCuda</b><br/>sda1 / 2 TB"]
@@ -74,14 +88,42 @@ flowchart LR
ROOT --> CACHE
end
class A,B,SSD,DATA,ROOT infraStorage
SEED -->|"Remote reads / SFTP via rclone"| MOUNT
ARR -->|"Import to /data/jellyfin/movies or tv_shows"| DATA
class A,B,SSD,DATA,ROOT,SEED infraStorage
class RAID infraCloud
class EFI,SWAP infraClient
class DOCKER,CACHE infraService
class DOCKER,CACHE,MOUNT,ARR infraService
```
RAID 0: striping; no redundancy; either HDD failure loses the array.
## Seedbox storage / imports
The [Ultra.cc seedbox](seedbox.md) is separate remote storage, not part of
Jupiter's RAID or SSD. Host `terra.usbx.me`, plan `Lancer-v2`: 1001 GB allocation,
984 GB available in the supplied 2026-10-06 snapshot.
```text
/home/jayo60013/downloads/qbittorrent (seedbox)
-> rclone remote seedbox:downloads/qbittorrent
-> /mnt/seedbox (Jupiter SFTP/FUSE mount)
-> /downloads (Radarr / Sonarr bind mount)
-> /data/jellyfin/{movies,tv_shows} (imported library on HDD array)
```
`rclone-seedbox.service` manages the mount; it is not a scheduled sync or full
local replica. `--vfs-cache-mode writes` streams read-only opens; the cache
location and size limit are unconfirmed. Cross-filesystem hardlinks to the
local libraries are impossible. Host remounts do not automatically propagate
through the containers' `rprivate` binds.
The six-directory Backrest plan does not cover the seedbox or media libraries;
the provider's own backup policy is unknown. FUSE-reported capacity does not
establish the account quota. Import/removal behaviour and mount details remain
documented on the [Seedbox](seedbox.md) page.
## Filesystems
Device names reflect the supplied snapshot; UUIDs identify filesystems.
@@ -137,11 +179,16 @@ Seedbox FUSE mount is service-managed, not listed in fstab.
| `/var/lib/docker` | SSD; Docker state and default local named volumes |
| `/var/lib/containerd` | SSD; observed containerd overlayfs snapshot storage |
| `/data/portainer` | HDD array; deployed [Portainer](portainer.md) state; backed up |
| `/data/authelia` | Configuration, users, SQLite, notifications |
| `/data/authentik/{postgres,data,blueprints}` | Authentik PostgreSQL, persistent files and custom blueprint; backed up |
| `/data/wardrowbe/{postgres,uploads}` | Wardrowbe database and uploads; backed up |
| `/data/wardrowbe/redis` | Wardrowbe Redis; excluded from backups |
| `/home/jay/data/wardrowbe/{ollama,rembg}` | SSD; Wardrowbe models/caches; outside backup plan |
| `/data/traefik/{acme,dynamic,certs}` | ACME state, dynamic configuration, certificates |
Cache placement is per mount, not globally SSD-backed. `/data` backups do not
implicitly include SSD-backed Docker volumes.
Authelia is retired; retention/deletion of its former `/data/authelia` directory
is unconfirmed. Authentik uses PostgreSQL, not the former Authelia SQLite store.
## Named-volume snapshot
@@ -160,4 +207,4 @@ Inspected volumes below use driver `local`, no driver options, and
Other volumes are present without a running consumer shown, including
`jellyfin_cache`, `notes_notes_static`, and monitoring volumes. Presence does
not prove use or justify deletion. Named volumes are outside the supplied
four-directory backup plan.
six-directory backup plan.