8.3 KiB
schema_version, id, type, scope, sensitivity, last_reviewed, sources, related, update_triggers, unknowns
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| 1 | home-server.authentication | reference |
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private-infrastructure | 2026-10-16 |
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Authentication
Authentik replaces Authelia. The owner wanted native OIDC rather than only forward-auth, with three access groups separating server administration, development tools and client-facing services. The owner reports the migration fully deployed, all integrations below complete and Authelia retired. Configuration details below are repository evidence, not live inspection.
| Component | Configuration |
|---|---|
| Portal | https://auth.umbra.mom |
| Identity service | Authentik server + worker; image 2026.8.4 |
| Database | PostgreSQL 16; database/user authentik |
| Configuration | stacks/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml; worker-mounted custom blueprint |
| Application MFA | jupiter-app-authorization; TOTP or WebAuthn; prompts for setup if none configured |
| Recent MFA | Five-minute reuse threshold avoids an immediate duplicate challenge |
| Host setup access | Loopback 127.0.0.1:9000 -> server 9000 |
Access groups
Owner terminology maps to the blueprint's exact group names:
| Intended group | Authentik group | Purpose / applications |
|---|---|---|
| Admin | admins |
Owner only; server health/operations: Backrest, Beszel, Dozzle, Notes, Prowlarr, Radarr, Sonarr |
| Developers | development |
Development services: Gitea, Portainer |
| Clients | clients |
Useful end-user services: Immich, Paperless, Wardrowbe |
Each application has an enabled group binding; policy_engine_mode: all;
binding failure result is false. All three groups have is_superuser: false:
admins application access is not Authentik superuser status.
No group hierarchy or membership assignment is declared by this blueprint.
Membership in admins alone does not grant the development/client applications;
users needing multiple categories need the corresponding memberships.
Actual deployed membership assignments were not supplied.
Native OIDC
Each client uses a confidential authorization-code provider, strict redirect URIs,
per-provider issuer and the shared application-MFA authorization flow.
Issuer pattern: https://auth.umbra.mom/application/o/<client-id>/.
| Client ID | Application hostname | Integration configuration |
|---|---|---|
beszel |
beszel.umbra.mom |
Database/UI provider; password-auth disable flag in Compose |
dozzle |
logs.umbra.mom |
Compose OIDC settings; no forward-auth middleware |
gitea |
gitea.umbra.mom |
Database/UI authentication source; Compose requires login for account linking and disables automatic registration |
immich |
photos.umbra.mom |
Database/UI OAuth settings; web and mobile callbacks registered |
paperless |
paperless.umbra.mom |
Compose OpenID Connect/allauth configuration; PKCE enabled; signups disabled |
portainer |
portainer.umbra.mom, portainer.local.umbra.mom |
Database/UI OAuth settings; both callback hosts registered |
wardrowbe |
wardrobe.umbra.mom |
Compose OIDC settings for frontend and backend/workers |
Dozzle's custom profile mapping emits dozzle_roles: ["none"] for admins
members and [] otherwise; application access is separately restricted to
admins. The email mapping asserts email_verified only when the user has
an email and their email_verified attribute is explicitly true.
OIDC integration does not prove local password login is disabled or application roles are synchronized. Beszel and Paperless retain migration-safe local-login defaults in Compose; deployed overrides and account-linking details were not supplied. Application permissions and existing sessions remain app-managed.
Forward-auth
Backrest (backups.umbra.mom), Notes, Prowlarr, Radarr and Sonarr retain
proxy-based protection. Their routers attach authentik@docker:
Traefik -> http://authentik-server:9000/outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/traefik
The embedded outpost serves five forward_single providers, each with an
explicit external host and empty skip_path_regex. A priority-1000 router
on those hosts sends /outpost.goauthentik.io/ directly to Authentik,
bypassing forward-auth so callbacks can complete.
trustForwardHeader=true; forwarded response headers:
X-authentik-username, X-authentik-groups, X-authentik-entitlements,
X-authentik-email, X-authentik-name, X-authentik-uid, X-authentik-jwt,
X-authentik-meta-jwks, X-authentik-meta-outpost, X-authentik-meta-provider,
X-authentik-meta-app, X-authentik-meta-version
Forward-auth applies only to attached routers. Authentik is not a global gate for every service, directly published port, SSH connection or API token.
State / secrets
| Host path | Container use |
|---|---|
/data/authentik/postgres |
PostgreSQL /var/lib/postgresql/data; identity, policy and MFA state |
/data/authentik/data |
Server + worker /data; persistent files |
/data/authentik/blueprints |
Worker /blueprints/custom:ro; host copy of repository blueprint |
Stack variable overrides/secrets are managed in Portainer; Compose retains non-secret configuration. Required Authentik stack secrets:
AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY
AUTHENTIK_DB_PASSWORD
OIDC_BESZEL_SECRET
OIDC_DOZZLE_SECRET
OIDC_GITEA_SECRET
OIDC_IMMICH_SECRET
OIDC_PAPERLESS_SECRET
OIDC_PORTAINER_SECRET
OIDC_WARDROWBE_SECRET
Client secrets are independently generated plaintext credentials, not old
Authelia password hashes. The worker passes them to blueprint !Env entries.
Keep each provider secret matched to its application configuration:
Dozzle uses DOZZLE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, Paperless
PAPERLESS_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, and Wardrowbe WARDROWBE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET.
Other clients store provider configuration in their databases/UIs.
Public Traefik routing defaults off (AUTHENTIK_PUBLIC_ROUTING=false) for
private initial setup; enable only after securing the administrator account.
The owner reports public deployment complete; this default is not deployed state.
See deployment for the configuration surfaces and order.
/data/authentik and Portainer state are included in
Backrest. Backups stop Authentik server/worker and PostgreSQL;
new OIDC logins and forward-auth access are unavailable during that stop.
Recovery remains untested, with no independent admin/MFA or stack-secret
recovery arrangement; only the restic key has independent custody.
Retention/deletion of retired /data/authelia data is unconfirmed.
GitHub repository access uses a PAT; host SSH keys and tunnel credential files
are separate from stack environment variables.