RAID/media tradeoff, CGNAT/public IPv4 rationale, no alerting and running monitoring/log containers, 2026-10-06
kind
reference
owner-report
Outages over one day catastrophic; no independent credentials except restic key, recovery evidence, host-config archive or operational rules, 2026-10-06
kind
reference
owner-report
OIDC and three-group motivation; Authentik fully deployed and Authelia retired; updated six-directory backup plan; independent recovery custody unchanged, 2026-10-16
Capacity prioritized over disk redundancy; downloaded media can be reacquired
Back up important state
Six application directories covered, subject to exclusions; media redundancy is not the objective
Mercury public edge
Static public IPv4; home ISP uses CGNAT
No residential public ingress
Owner preference to avoid exposing the home IP
Authentik instead of Authelia
Native OIDC rather than only forward-auth; retain forward-auth where needed
Three access categories
Admin: owner only, server health/operations; Developers: development services such as Gitea/Portainer; Clients: useful end-user services such as Wardrowbe/Paperless
RAID 0 still stores important state alongside media: either HDD failure loses
the array; recovery depends on working backups. Owner intent is not evidence
that every important dataset is covered.
The Authentik migration is complete by owner report; Authelia is retired.
Exact repository group names, app assignments and MFA policy are in
Authentication. Group access is not the same as application
administrator privileges or Authentik superuser status.
Observability
Facility
Current configuration
Host/container monitoring
Beszel hub and host-network agent present
Container logs
Dozzle with Docker socket proxy present
Automatic alerting
None configured
Monitoring does not imply notification delivery. Backup-hook failures,
stopped services and storage failures require manual detection.
The backup plan stops Authentik, interrupting new OIDC logins and forward-auth
access. Authentik/Wardrowbe restart hooks ignore errors, so backup completion
alone does not establish that authentication or applications recovered.
Recovery status
Item
Current status
Jupiter outage tolerance
At most 24 hours; longer is catastrophic to the owner
Recovery time
Not measured; 24-hour objective is not demonstrated
Acceptable data loss / RPO
Not defined
Independent recovery secrets
Restic encryption key only
Backup/integrity evidence
None supplied
Restore exercise
Never performed
Independent host-config archive
Not maintained
Operational rules / rollback policy
Not established
Backup scope is documented in Backups. The six-directory plan now
includes Authentik identity/MFA state and Wardrowbe data, but does not establish
OS, broader host-configuration or named-volume recovery. There is still no
independent Authentik admin/MFA or stack-secret recovery arrangement.
Proposed recovery storage
Not implemented:
Private Git repository: sanitized host configuration and bootstrap instructions.
Encrypted off-host/offline archive: required credentials and secret-bearing configuration.
Independent access instructions: account recovery, archive location and decryption.
Access/decryption must work without Jupiter or Portainer. A private Git
repository is not a substitute for protecting secret values. Restic key custody
alone does not provide Google Drive access.