230 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
230 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
---
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schema_version: 1
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id: home-server.ideas-next-steps
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type: plan
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scope: [jupiter, mercury, private-access, recovery, downloads, power, services]
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sensitivity: private-infrastructure
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last_reviewed: "2026-10-22"
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sources:
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- kind: owner-report
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reference: "Access, device-loss recovery, hardware constraints, broadband and VPN preferences interview, 2026-10-22"
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- kind: documentation
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reference: "Planning discussion based on jupiter-stacks and home-server reference notes, 2026-10-22; proposals only, no live inspection or deployment"
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related:
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- home-server.reference
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- home-server.networking
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- home-server.authentication
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- home-server.backups
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- home-server.operations
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- home-server.seedbox
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- home-server.storage
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- home-server.host
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update_triggers: [implementation, priority-change, access-requirements-change, pricing-change, power-measurement]
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unknowns:
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- live-routing-firewall-and-wireguard-configuration
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- work-laptop-local-dns-and-lan-access-policy
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- measured-wall-power-and-electricity-tariff
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- current-vpn-plan-features-and-pricing
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- immich-original-photo-backup-coverage
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---
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# Ideas / next steps
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Planning backlog from the 2026-10-22 discussion. These are recommendations and
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owner preferences, **not implemented changes or deployment evidence**.
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Existing reference pages describe the documented configuration; update them
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when changes are actually deployed.
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## Requirements confirmed with the owner
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| Area | Requirement / preference |
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| --- | --- |
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| Private administration | Portainer, Beszel, Dozzle, Backrest, Prowlarr, Radarr and Sonarr should stop being publicly reachable |
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| Public applications | Keep normal user-facing applications public, including Vaultwarden |
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| Personal devices | Owner-only admin access; VPN clients or certificates can be installed on personal phone/laptop |
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| Work laptop | Browser-only admin access needed on home Wi-Fi; cannot install VPN clients or certificates |
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| Device loss | Vaultwarden access remains essential; admin tools can wait until returning home |
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| Vaultwarden recovery | Owner knows the master password; TOTP is backed up/restorable through Microsoft, with independently recoverable Microsoft access; owner report, not an observed recovery exercise |
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| Private-access tooling | Prefer minimal infrastructure and no vendor-hosted coordination service; existing Cloudflare DNS/SSH use is acceptable |
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| Hardware | Software/BIOS tuning only; no hardware purchases or removals |
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| Broadband | Reported 500 Mbps download and upload; public trackers only |
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| VPN candidates | Proton VPN or AirVPN; owner quotes GBP 2.50/month without upfront commitment; exact plan/features/pricing not independently checked |
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| New services | Interested in reliability, everyday tools, media, development and privacy |
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## Priority order
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1. Prepare independent recovery access, then introduce private admin ingress.
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2. Make backups recoverable and add failure notifications.
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3. Replace the seedbox with VPN-isolated local downloads if the trial succeeds.
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4. Measure and tune power use.
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5. Add services that solve an actual day-to-day problem.
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## Private admin access
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### Preferred approach: plain WireGuard through Mercury
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Reuse Mercury's public address and existing WireGuard connection to Jupiter.
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Give each personal device its own peer/key, narrowly scoped routes and firewall
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permissions. No Tailscale account or self-hosted coordination service is needed.
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| Client | Intended access path |
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| --- | --- |
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| Work laptop on home Wi-Fi | LAN directly to private admin ingress; browser only |
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| Personal device away from home | WireGuard to Mercury, then routed private access to Jupiter |
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| Public internet | Mercury nginx to explicitly public applications only |
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Use split DNS: admin hostnames resolve to private addresses on the LAN and
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through the VPN. Keep HTTPS certificates using the existing DNS-based challenge;
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certificate issuance does not require a public website.
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Before choosing exact addresses/listeners, inspect live WireGuard `AllowedIPs`,
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routing, firewall rules and Docker port publication. Check that the work laptop's
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corporate DNS/proxy policy permits local access; do not bypass employer controls.
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### Implementation checklist
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- [ ] Prepare recovery access and a rollback route before restricting ingress.
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- [ ] Add per-device WireGuard peers and a way to revoke a lost device's key.
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- [ ] Configure LAN/VPN DNS for the private admin hostnames.
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- [ ] Create private-only Traefik ingress; public requests must not reach admin
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backends simply by supplying their hostnames.
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- [ ] Replace or constrain Mercury's wildcard forwarding in
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`jupiter-stacks/mercury/nginx/umbra.mom`, retaining all intended public apps.
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- [ ] Apply the same boundary to Authentik's separate outpost callback routes
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for Backrest and the Arr applications.
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- [ ] Remove or restrict Portainer's direct `9123:9000` publication in
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`stacks/portainer/portainer_start.sh`.
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- [ ] Retain application authentication and Authentik MFA behind the private
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boundary; VPN connectivity must not imply application administrator rights.
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- [ ] Confirm private apps and authentication callbacks work from LAN and VPN,
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but cannot be reached through public ingress or alternative published ports.
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- [ ] Confirm public applications, especially Vaultwarden, remain accessible.
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Removing public DNS records or adding a login page is not sufficient isolation.
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The network/proxy boundary must enforce the restriction.
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### Alternatives
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| Option | Assessment |
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| --- | --- |
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| Plain WireGuard | Preferred: reuse existing infrastructure, few devices, no hosted control service |
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| Tailscale | Convenient, but adds the vendor dependency the owner prefers to avoid |
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| Headscale | Self-hosted coordination, but more infrastructure to maintain than currently needed |
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| mTLS | Device-certificate authentication; adds certificate distribution/recovery and cannot be used directly on the work laptop |
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mTLS rejects clients without a certificate but leaves the HTTPS endpoint
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internet-facing. Mercury terminates public TLS, so browser client-certificate
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enforcement would need to happen there, not merely between Mercury and Jupiter.
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## Recovery and reliability
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Keep Vaultwarden public with application login and MFA. Do not make access
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depend on the new admin VPN or Authentik.
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- [ ] Maintain an encrypted recovery pack outside Jupiter: Mercury provider
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console/SSH access, WireGuard re-enrolment instructions, Authentik recovery,
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retained local admin credentials, backup credentials, restic key, stack
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secrets and essential host configuration.
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- [ ] Ensure retrieving/decrypting that pack does not depend on Jupiter,
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Portainer or secrets available only inside Vaultwarden.
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- [ ] Retain the existing Cloudflare SSH route during migration, with its
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effective Access policy reviewed. It still depends on Jupiter's connector
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and networking; it is not an out-of-band console.
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- [ ] Restore an important service into an isolated location and record the
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dependencies, time taken and acceptable data loss.
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- [ ] Review backup coverage for Backrest configuration, host configuration,
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Docker named volumes and Mercury.
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- [ ] Establish whether Immich contains irreplaceable originals and where those
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originals and the associated database are backed up.
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- [ ] Make failed backup restart hooks visible; a successful snapshot must not
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hide stopped Authentik, Portainer or Wardrowbe services.
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- [ ] Add service, disk-health, capacity and backup-failure notifications using
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Beszel and the existing Mercury uptime service where suitable.
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- [ ] Add an external missed-backup heartbeat so Jupiter going offline cannot
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prevent notification of its own failure.
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Private connectivity does not fix Authentik downtime. The documented backup plan
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stops Authentik and ignores some restart failures; independent SSH/local recovery
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remains necessary. See [Backups](backups.md) and [Operations](operations.md).
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## Local downloads instead of the seedbox
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At the owner's quoted prices, replacing the GBP 4.50/month seedbox with a
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GBP 2.50/month VPN saves **GBP 2/month or GBP 24/year before extra electricity**.
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Confirm actual plan terms before purchasing. The simpler local storage/import
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path may be more valuable than the modest subscription saving.
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### Proposed arrangement
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- [ ] Check the chosen Proton VPN/AirVPN plan supports P2P and the intended
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manual/container connection; assess port forwarding for peer connectivity.
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- [ ] Run qBittorrent behind a VPN gateway container such as Gluetun.
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- [ ] Block torrent egress whenever the VPN is unavailable, including startup;
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use qBittorrent interface binding as additional protection.
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- [ ] Keep the qBittorrent Web UI private and ensure DNS/IPv6 cannot bypass
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the intended VPN path.
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- [ ] Keep the host, public applications and admin-access WireGuard routes on
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their normal connections. The commercial download VPN is a separate job.
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- [ ] Use a common container mount layout for downloads and media on the HDD
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filesystem so Radarr/Sonarr can hardlink imports while torrents seed.
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- [ ] Confirm imports, seeding, removal behaviour and VPN-failure isolation
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before cancelling the seedbox.
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- [ ] Migrate any retained downloads and remove the rclone/FUSE dependency only
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after the replacement workflow works.
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A hardlink gives the same file data two names without storing a second full
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copy. The current separate download/library mounts need review; sharing physical
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disks alone is not enough.
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The [Seedbox](seedbox.md) notes record an expiry of 2026-10-25. Confirm renewal
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status rather than assuming this snapshot is still the billing state.
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## Electricity and compute efficiency
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Reported average CPU usage is approximately 1%, but CPU utilisation does not
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measure wall-socket power. No power measurement or actual electricity tariff
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was supplied.
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Illustrative costs at **25p/kWh**, using 365 days/year divided by 12:
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| Continuous average draw | Approximate monthly cost |
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| --- | --- |
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| 40 W | GBP 7.30 |
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| 60 W | GBP 10.95 |
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| 80 W | GBP 14.60 |
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At that illustrative tariff, saving 10 W continuously saves about GBP 18/year.
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An extra average draw of about 11 W would consume the GBP 2/month seedbox saving.
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Count the incremental download workload, not the server's existing baseline.
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- [ ] Measure wall power and obtain the actual unit rate when practical.
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- [ ] Inspect CPU idle states and frequency-scaling policy before BIOS tuning;
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low CPU limits do not automatically save energy.
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- [ ] Inspect RAM pressure and swapping during Immich processing and Wardrowbe
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Ollama jobs; the host has 16 GB RAM.
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- [ ] Schedule heavy jobs where useful and avoid unnecessary repeated scans.
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- [ ] Review effective container log rotation; daemon defaults require activation
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and recreation, and explicit Compose settings override them.
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- [ ] Avoid aggressive HDD spindown while `/data` hosts active databases.
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- [ ] Avoid consolidating unrelated application databases solely to reduce
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container count; shared failures/upgrades may outweigh uncertain savings.
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No hardware changes are proposed. Leave spare CPU capacity idle unless a useful
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workload justifies the added power and maintenance.
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## Optional service ideas
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These are candidates, not a deployment list.
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| Area | Idea | Constraint / reason |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| Reliability | Notifications and external backup heartbeats | Start with existing monitoring rather than a second metrics stack |
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| Privacy | AdGuard Home or Pi-hole | Choose one; household DNS availability becomes an operational dependency |
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| Files | Syncthing for selected folders | Sync is not backup; check client support on the owner's devices |
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| Bookmarks / reading | Linkding; FreshRSS | Small tools with a clear everyday purpose |
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| Development | Renovate automation for existing Gitea workflows | Propose updates; avoid unattended production upgrades |
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| Media | Profilarr for supported Arr profiles/custom formats | Add only if manual profile maintenance is a real problem |
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Defer Kubernetes, a large metrics stack, another identity provider or a general
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cloud suite unless a concrete need emerges.
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