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notes/docs/home-server/ideas-next-steps.md
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schema_version, id, type, scope, sensitivity, last_reviewed, sources, related, update_triggers, unknowns
schema_version id type scope sensitivity last_reviewed sources related update_triggers unknowns
1 home-server.ideas-next-steps plan
jupiter
mercury
private-access
recovery
downloads
power
services
private-infrastructure 2026-10-22
kind reference
owner-report Access, device-loss recovery, hardware constraints, broadband and VPN preferences interview, 2026-10-22
kind reference
documentation Planning discussion based on jupiter-stacks and home-server reference notes, 2026-10-22; proposals only, no live inspection or deployment
home-server.reference
home-server.networking
home-server.authentication
home-server.backups
home-server.operations
home-server.seedbox
home-server.storage
home-server.host
implementation
priority-change
access-requirements-change
pricing-change
power-measurement
live-routing-firewall-and-wireguard-configuration
work-laptop-local-dns-and-lan-access-policy
measured-wall-power-and-electricity-tariff
current-vpn-plan-features-and-pricing
immich-original-photo-backup-coverage

Ideas / next steps

Planning backlog from the 2026-10-22 discussion. These are recommendations and owner preferences, not implemented changes or deployment evidence. Existing reference pages describe the documented configuration; update them when changes are actually deployed.

Requirements confirmed with the owner

Area Requirement / preference
Private administration Portainer, Beszel, Dozzle, Backrest, Prowlarr, Radarr and Sonarr should stop being publicly reachable
Public applications Keep normal user-facing applications public, including Vaultwarden
Personal devices Owner-only admin access; VPN clients or certificates can be installed on personal phone/laptop
Work laptop Browser-only admin access needed on home Wi-Fi; cannot install VPN clients or certificates
Device loss Vaultwarden access remains essential; admin tools can wait until returning home
Vaultwarden recovery Owner knows the master password; TOTP is backed up/restorable through Microsoft, with independently recoverable Microsoft access; owner report, not an observed recovery exercise
Private-access tooling Prefer minimal infrastructure and no vendor-hosted coordination service; existing Cloudflare DNS/SSH use is acceptable
Hardware Software/BIOS tuning only; no hardware purchases or removals
Broadband Reported 500 Mbps download and upload; public trackers only
VPN candidates Proton VPN or AirVPN; owner quotes GBP 2.50/month without upfront commitment; exact plan/features/pricing not independently checked
New services Interested in reliability, everyday tools, media, development and privacy

Priority order

  1. Prepare independent recovery access, then introduce private admin ingress.
  2. Make backups recoverable and add failure notifications.
  3. Replace the seedbox with VPN-isolated local downloads if the trial succeeds.
  4. Measure and tune power use.
  5. Add services that solve an actual day-to-day problem.

Private admin access

Preferred approach: plain WireGuard through Mercury

Reuse Mercury's public address and existing WireGuard connection to Jupiter. Give each personal device its own peer/key, narrowly scoped routes and firewall permissions. No Tailscale account or self-hosted coordination service is needed.

Client Intended access path
Work laptop on home Wi-Fi LAN directly to private admin ingress; browser only
Personal device away from home WireGuard to Mercury, then routed private access to Jupiter
Public internet Mercury nginx to explicitly public applications only

Use split DNS: admin hostnames resolve to private addresses on the LAN and through the VPN. Keep HTTPS certificates using the existing DNS-based challenge; certificate issuance does not require a public website.

Before choosing exact addresses/listeners, inspect live WireGuard AllowedIPs, routing, firewall rules and Docker port publication. Check that the work laptop's corporate DNS/proxy policy permits local access; do not bypass employer controls.

Implementation checklist

  • Prepare recovery access and a rollback route before restricting ingress.
  • Add per-device WireGuard peers and a way to revoke a lost device's key.
  • Configure LAN/VPN DNS for the private admin hostnames.
  • Create private-only Traefik ingress; public requests must not reach admin backends simply by supplying their hostnames.
  • Replace or constrain Mercury's wildcard forwarding in jupiter-stacks/mercury/nginx/umbra.mom, retaining all intended public apps.
  • Apply the same boundary to Authentik's separate outpost callback routes for Backrest and the Arr applications.
  • Remove or restrict Portainer's direct 9123:9000 publication in stacks/portainer/portainer_start.sh.
  • Retain application authentication and Authentik MFA behind the private boundary; VPN connectivity must not imply application administrator rights.
  • Confirm private apps and authentication callbacks work from LAN and VPN, but cannot be reached through public ingress or alternative published ports.
  • Confirm public applications, especially Vaultwarden, remain accessible.

Removing public DNS records or adding a login page is not sufficient isolation. The network/proxy boundary must enforce the restriction.

Alternatives

Option Assessment
Plain WireGuard Preferred: reuse existing infrastructure, few devices, no hosted control service
Tailscale Convenient, but adds the vendor dependency the owner prefers to avoid
Headscale Self-hosted coordination, but more infrastructure to maintain than currently needed
mTLS Device-certificate authentication; adds certificate distribution/recovery and cannot be used directly on the work laptop

mTLS rejects clients without a certificate but leaves the HTTPS endpoint internet-facing. Mercury terminates public TLS, so browser client-certificate enforcement would need to happen there, not merely between Mercury and Jupiter.

Recovery and reliability

Keep Vaultwarden public with application login and MFA. Do not make access depend on the new admin VPN or Authentik.

  • Maintain an encrypted recovery pack outside Jupiter: Mercury provider console/SSH access, WireGuard re-enrolment instructions, Authentik recovery, retained local admin credentials, backup credentials, restic key, stack secrets and essential host configuration.
  • Ensure retrieving/decrypting that pack does not depend on Jupiter, Portainer or secrets available only inside Vaultwarden.
  • Retain the existing Cloudflare SSH route during migration, with its effective Access policy reviewed. It still depends on Jupiter's connector and networking; it is not an out-of-band console.
  • Restore an important service into an isolated location and record the dependencies, time taken and acceptable data loss.
  • Review backup coverage for Backrest configuration, host configuration, Docker named volumes and Mercury.
  • Establish whether Immich contains irreplaceable originals and where those originals and the associated database are backed up.
  • Make failed backup restart hooks visible; a successful snapshot must not hide stopped Authentik, Portainer or Wardrowbe services.
  • Add service, disk-health, capacity and backup-failure notifications using Beszel and the existing Mercury uptime service where suitable.
  • Add an external missed-backup heartbeat so Jupiter going offline cannot prevent notification of its own failure.

Private connectivity does not fix Authentik downtime. The documented backup plan stops Authentik and ignores some restart failures; independent SSH/local recovery remains necessary. See Backups and Operations.

Local downloads instead of the seedbox

At the owner's quoted prices, replacing the GBP 4.50/month seedbox with a GBP 2.50/month VPN saves GBP 2/month or GBP 24/year before extra electricity. Confirm actual plan terms before purchasing. The simpler local storage/import path may be more valuable than the modest subscription saving.

Proposed arrangement

  • Check the chosen Proton VPN/AirVPN plan supports P2P and the intended manual/container connection; assess port forwarding for peer connectivity.
  • Run qBittorrent behind a VPN gateway container such as Gluetun.
  • Block torrent egress whenever the VPN is unavailable, including startup; use qBittorrent interface binding as additional protection.
  • Keep the qBittorrent Web UI private and ensure DNS/IPv6 cannot bypass the intended VPN path.
  • Keep the host, public applications and admin-access WireGuard routes on their normal connections. The commercial download VPN is a separate job.
  • Use a common container mount layout for downloads and media on the HDD filesystem so Radarr/Sonarr can hardlink imports while torrents seed.
  • Confirm imports, seeding, removal behaviour and VPN-failure isolation before cancelling the seedbox.
  • Migrate any retained downloads and remove the rclone/FUSE dependency only after the replacement workflow works.

A hardlink gives the same file data two names without storing a second full copy. The current separate download/library mounts need review; sharing physical disks alone is not enough.

The Seedbox notes record an expiry of 2026-10-25. Confirm renewal status rather than assuming this snapshot is still the billing state.

Electricity and compute efficiency

Reported average CPU usage is approximately 1%, but CPU utilisation does not measure wall-socket power. No power measurement or actual electricity tariff was supplied.

Illustrative costs at 25p/kWh, using 365 days/year divided by 12:

Continuous average draw Approximate monthly cost
40 W GBP 7.30
60 W GBP 10.95
80 W GBP 14.60

At that illustrative tariff, saving 10 W continuously saves about GBP 18/year. An extra average draw of about 11 W would consume the GBP 2/month seedbox saving. Count the incremental download workload, not the server's existing baseline.

  • Measure wall power and obtain the actual unit rate when practical.
  • Inspect CPU idle states and frequency-scaling policy before BIOS tuning; low CPU limits do not automatically save energy.
  • Inspect RAM pressure and swapping during Immich processing and Wardrowbe Ollama jobs; the host has 16 GB RAM.
  • Schedule heavy jobs where useful and avoid unnecessary repeated scans.
  • Review effective container log rotation; daemon defaults require activation and recreation, and explicit Compose settings override them.
  • Avoid aggressive HDD spindown while /data hosts active databases.
  • Avoid consolidating unrelated application databases solely to reduce container count; shared failures/upgrades may outweigh uncertain savings.

No hardware changes are proposed. Leave spare CPU capacity idle unless a useful workload justifies the added power and maintenance.

Optional service ideas

These are candidates, not a deployment list.

Area Idea Constraint / reason
Reliability Notifications and external backup heartbeats Start with existing monitoring rather than a second metrics stack
Privacy AdGuard Home or Pi-hole Choose one; household DNS availability becomes an operational dependency
Files Syncthing for selected folders Sync is not backup; check client support on the owner's devices
Bookmarks / reading Linkding; FreshRSS Small tools with a clear everyday purpose
Development Renovate automation for existing Gitea workflows Propose updates; avoid unattended production upgrades
Media Profilarr for supported Arr profiles/custom formats Add only if manual profile maintenance is a real problem

Defer Kubernetes, a large metrics stack, another identity provider or a general cloud suite unless a concrete need emerges.