--- schema_version: 1 id: home-server.authentication type: reference scope: [jupiter, authentik, oidc, forward-auth, access-groups, secrets] sensitivity: private-infrastructure last_reviewed: "2026-10-16" sources: - kind: owner-report reference: "Authentik fully deployed, all listed app integrations complete and Authelia retired; OIDC and three-group motivation, 2026-10-16" - kind: owner-report reference: "Six-directory Backrest plan including Authentik and Wardrowbe; deployed Authentik container names confirmed, 2026-10-16" - kind: owner-report reference: "All stack environment values/secrets managed in Portainer; GitHub access uses PAT, 2026-10-06" - kind: owner-report reference: "Independent credential recovery unchanged: only restic key has independent custody, 2026-10-16" - kind: repository repository: jupiter-stacks revision: d09df456ad331b8beb9a40615114ea8aae2dced5 paths: - stacks/authentik/docker-compose.yml - stacks/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml - stacks/authentik/.env.example - stacks/beszel/docker-compose.yml - stacks/dozzle/docker-compose.yml - stacks/gitea/docker-compose.yml - stacks/immich/docker-compose.yml - stacks/paperless-ngx/docker-compose.yml - stacks/portainer/portainer_start.sh - stacks/wardrowbe/docker-compose.yml - stacks/backrest/docker-compose.yml - stacks/notes/docker-compose.yml - stacks/prowlarr/docker-compose.yml - stacks/radarr/docker-compose.yml - stacks/sonarr/docker-compose.yml related: [home-server.reference, home-server.networking, home-server.portainer, home-server.backups, home-server.deployment] update_triggers: [access-policy-change, authentication-change, secret-rotation, middleware-change] unknowns: - deployed-group-memberships - per-application-local-login-and-account-linking-settings - retired-authelia-data-retention --- # Authentication Authentik replaces Authelia. The owner wanted native OIDC rather than only forward-auth, with three access groups separating server administration, development tools and client-facing services. The owner reports the migration fully deployed, all integrations below complete and Authelia retired. Configuration details below are repository evidence, not live inspection. | Component | Configuration | | --- | --- | | Portal | `https://auth.umbra.mom` | | Identity service | Authentik server + worker; image `2026.8.4` | | Database | PostgreSQL 16; database/user `authentik` | | Configuration | `stacks/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml`; worker-mounted custom blueprint | | Application MFA | `jupiter-app-authorization`; TOTP or WebAuthn; prompts for setup if none configured | | Recent MFA | Five-minute reuse threshold avoids an immediate duplicate challenge | | Host setup access | Loopback `127.0.0.1:9000` -> server `9000` | ## Access groups Owner terminology maps to the blueprint's exact group names: | Intended group | Authentik group | Purpose / applications | | --- | --- | --- | | Admin | `admins` | Owner only; server health/operations: Backrest, Beszel, Dozzle, Notes, Prowlarr, Radarr, Sonarr | | Developers | `development` | Development services: Gitea, Portainer | | Clients | `clients` | Useful end-user services: Immich, Paperless, Wardrowbe | Each application has an enabled group binding; `policy_engine_mode: all`; binding failure result is false. All three groups have `is_superuser: false`: `admins` application access is not Authentik superuser status. No group hierarchy or membership assignment is declared by this blueprint. Membership in `admins` alone does not grant the development/client applications; users needing multiple categories need the corresponding memberships. Actual deployed membership assignments were not supplied. ## Native OIDC Each client uses a confidential authorization-code provider, strict redirect URIs, per-provider issuer and the shared application-MFA authorization flow. Issuer pattern: `https://auth.umbra.mom/application/o//`. | Client ID | Application hostname | Integration configuration | | --- | --- | --- | | `beszel` | `beszel.umbra.mom` | Database/UI provider; password-auth disable flag in Compose | | `dozzle` | `logs.umbra.mom` | Compose OIDC settings; no forward-auth middleware | | `gitea` | `gitea.umbra.mom` | Database/UI authentication source; Compose requires login for account linking and disables automatic registration | | `immich` | `photos.umbra.mom` | Database/UI OAuth settings; web and mobile callbacks registered | | `paperless` | `paperless.umbra.mom` | Compose OpenID Connect/allauth configuration; PKCE enabled; signups disabled | | `portainer` | `portainer.umbra.mom`, `portainer.local.umbra.mom` | Database/UI OAuth settings; both callback hosts registered | | `wardrowbe` | `wardrobe.umbra.mom` | Compose OIDC settings for frontend and backend/workers | Dozzle's custom profile mapping emits `dozzle_roles: ["none"]` for `admins` members and `[]` otherwise; application access is separately restricted to `admins`. The email mapping asserts `email_verified` only when the user has an email and their `email_verified` attribute is explicitly true. OIDC integration does not prove local password login is disabled or application roles are synchronized. Beszel and Paperless retain migration-safe local-login defaults in Compose; deployed overrides and account-linking details were not supplied. Application permissions and existing sessions remain app-managed. ## Forward-auth Backrest (`backups.umbra.mom`), Notes, Prowlarr, Radarr and Sonarr retain proxy-based protection. Their routers attach `authentik@docker`: ```text Traefik -> http://authentik-server:9000/outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/traefik ``` The embedded outpost serves five `forward_single` providers, each with an explicit external host and empty `skip_path_regex`. A priority-1000 router on those hosts sends `/outpost.goauthentik.io/` directly to Authentik, bypassing forward-auth so callbacks can complete. `trustForwardHeader=true`; forwarded response headers: ```text X-authentik-username, X-authentik-groups, X-authentik-entitlements, X-authentik-email, X-authentik-name, X-authentik-uid, X-authentik-jwt, X-authentik-meta-jwks, X-authentik-meta-outpost, X-authentik-meta-provider, X-authentik-meta-app, X-authentik-meta-version ``` Forward-auth applies only to attached routers. Authentik is not a global gate for every service, directly published port, SSH connection or API token. ## State / secrets | Host path | Container use | | --- | --- | | `/data/authentik/postgres` | PostgreSQL `/var/lib/postgresql/data`; identity, policy and MFA state | | `/data/authentik/data` | Server + worker `/data`; persistent files | | `/data/authentik/blueprints` | Worker `/blueprints/custom:ro`; host copy of repository blueprint | Stack variable overrides/secrets are managed in Portainer; Compose retains non-secret configuration. Required Authentik stack secrets: ```text AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY AUTHENTIK_DB_PASSWORD OIDC_BESZEL_SECRET OIDC_DOZZLE_SECRET OIDC_GITEA_SECRET OIDC_IMMICH_SECRET OIDC_PAPERLESS_SECRET OIDC_PORTAINER_SECRET OIDC_WARDROWBE_SECRET ``` Client secrets are independently generated plaintext credentials, not old Authelia password hashes. The worker passes them to blueprint `!Env` entries. Keep each provider secret matched to its application configuration: Dozzle uses `DOZZLE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`, Paperless `PAPERLESS_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`, and Wardrowbe `WARDROWBE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`. Other clients store provider configuration in their databases/UIs. Public Traefik routing defaults off (`AUTHENTIK_PUBLIC_ROUTING=false`) for private initial setup; enable only after securing the administrator account. The owner reports public deployment complete; this default is not deployed state. See [deployment](deployment.md) for the configuration surfaces and order. `/data/authentik` and [Portainer state](portainer.md) are included in [Backrest](backups.md). Backups stop Authentik server/worker and PostgreSQL; new OIDC logins and forward-auth access are unavailable during that stop. Recovery remains untested, with no independent admin/MFA or stack-secret recovery arrangement; only the restic key has independent custody. Retention/deletion of retired `/data/authelia` data is unconfirmed. GitHub repository access uses a PAT; host SSH keys and tunnel credential files are separate from stack environment variables.