update notes for airvpn

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John Gatward committed 2026-10-26 12:10:24 +00:00
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+49 -24
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@@ -2,10 +2,14 @@
schema_version: 1
id: home-server.authentication
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, authentik, oidc, forward-auth, access-groups, secrets]
scope: [jupiter, authentik, oidc, forward-auth, per-user-access, secrets]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-18"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-26"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Public qbittorrent.umbra.mom UI working through Mercury/Traefik/Authentik with native qBittorrent login retained, 2026-10-26; does not establish broader per-user migration completion"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Requested removal of custom service-access groups, manual per-user application access and retained Jay administration, 2026-10-26; repository prepared, deployment unconfirmed"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Requested Authentik-only Homarr login and read-only Docker socket proxy; deployment not confirmed, 2026-10-18"
- kind: owner-report
@@ -49,16 +53,18 @@ sources:
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.networking, home-server.portainer, home-server.backups, home-server.deployment]
update_triggers: [access-policy-change, authentication-change, secret-rotation, middleware-change]
unknowns:
- deployed-group-memberships
- deployed-per-user-bindings-and-jay-superuser-membership
- per-application-local-login-and-account-linking-settings
- retired-authelia-data-retention
---
# Authentication
Authentik replaces Authelia. The owner wanted native OIDC rather than only
forward-auth, with three access groups separating server administration,
development tools and client-facing services. The owner reports the migration
Authentik replaces Authelia. The original setup used native OIDC and forward-auth
with three access groups. On 2026-10-26 the owner requested direct per-user
service access instead; the repository now prepares that migration, with `jay`
allowed into every configured application. Deployment is unconfirmed.
The owner reports the earlier Authentik migration
fully deployed as of 2026-10-16 and Authelia retired. Homarr OIDC login was
reported working on 2026-10-18; linking to the existing account is configured
in the repository but has not been confirmed successful.
@@ -74,23 +80,34 @@ Configuration details below are repository evidence, not live inspection.
| Recent MFA | Five-minute reuse threshold avoids an immediate duplicate challenge |
| Host setup access | Loopback `127.0.0.1:9000` -> server `9000` |
## Access groups
## Per-user application access
Owner terminology maps to the blueprint's exact group names:
Every one of the 15 configured applications has a direct binding for the
**existing** Authentik user `jay`, at order `0`. Applications use
`policy_engine_mode: any`: Jay **or** another explicitly added user may pass.
Unassigned users are denied, and the shared application-MFA flow remains.
The blueprint does not create users or change passwords, MFA devices or
application-native administrator roles.
| Intended group | Authentik group | Purpose / applications |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Admin | `admins` | Owner only; server health/operations: Backrest, Beszel, Dozzle, Notes, Prowlarr, Radarr, Sonarr |
| Developers | `development` | Development services: Gitea, Portainer |
| Clients | `clients` | Useful end-user services: Immich, Paperless, Wardrowbe |
Add other users in the application's **Policy / Group / User Bindings** tab,
using a **User** binding with order `10` or higher, enabled and not negated.
Keep ANY mode and retain Jay's order-0 binding. Manual bindings at other orders
are not removed by blueprint reapplication. Admission does not itself grant
administrator privileges inside a service.
Each application in the access-group table has an enabled group binding; `policy_engine_mode: all`;
binding failure result is false. All three groups have `is_superuser: false`:
`admins` application access is not Authentik superuser status.
No group hierarchy or membership assignment is declared by this blueprint.
Membership in `admins` alone does not grant the development/client applications;
users needing multiple categories need the corresponding memberships.
Actual deployed membership assignments were not supplied.
The blueprint deletes only the custom `admins`, `development` and `clients`
groups after replacing their bindings; their memberships and group-based grants
are removed. **Retain Jay's built-in superuser group membership**, normally
`authentik Admins`: Authentik derives administrator status from a superuser
group, so removing every group would lock out administration.
Before applying, back up Authentik, confirm Jay is still a superuser, and redeploy
Trek with its username-based admin mapping. Copy the updated blueprint into the
host's `/data/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml` and apply it, then individually
assign the other users you want to retain. See the
[access-management runbook](https://github.com/jayo60013/jupiter-stacks/blob/main/stacks/authentik/README.md)
for rollout and rollback. Existing application sessions/API keys need separate
revocation when removing access.
## Native OIDC
@@ -107,11 +124,12 @@ Issuer pattern: `https://auth.umbra.mom/application/o/<client-id>/`.
| `immich` | `photos.umbra.mom` | Database/UI OAuth settings; web and mobile callbacks registered |
| `paperless` | `paperless.umbra.mom` | Compose OpenID Connect/allauth configuration; PKCE enabled; signups disabled |
| `portainer` | `portainer.umbra.mom`, `portainer.local.umbra.mom` | Database/UI OAuth settings; both callback hosts registered |
| `trek` | `holidays.umbra.mom` | Compose OIDC settings; `preferred_username == jay` grants the app admin role |
| `wardrowbe` | `wardrobe.umbra.mom` | Compose OIDC settings for frontend and backend/workers |
Dozzle's custom profile mapping emits `dozzle_roles: ["none"]` for `admins`
members and `[]` otherwise; application access is separately restricted to
`admins`. The email mapping asserts `email_verified` only when the user has
Dozzle's custom profile mapping emits `dozzle_roles: ["none"]` for any user
admitted by its direct application bindings. Its Docker proxy stays read-only.
The email mapping asserts `email_verified` only when the user has
an email and their `email_verified` attribute is explicitly true.
OIDC integration does not prove local password login is disabled or application
@@ -180,7 +198,14 @@ proxy-based protection. Their routers attach `authentik@docker`:
Traefik -> http://authentik-server:9000/outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/traefik
```
The embedded outpost serves five `forward_single` providers, each with an
The blueprint now includes a sixth `forward_single` provider for
`qbittorrent.umbra.mom`, with a direct `jay` user binding and the shared MFA flow.
The owner confirms its public UI and both authentication layers are working
on 2026-10-26. This confirmation is specific to qBittorrent, not proof that the
broader per-user access migration is complete. qBittorrent retains its own password login, and internal Arr API
connections do not pass through Authentik. See [Local downloads](downloads.md).
The embedded-outpost blueprint lists six `forward_single` providers, each with an
explicit external host and empty `skip_path_regex`. A priority-1000 router
on those hosts sends `/outpost.goauthentik.io/` directly to Authentik,
bypassing forward-auth so callbacks can complete.
+19 -2
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@@ -4,8 +4,10 @@ id: home-server.backups
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, backrest, restic, google-drive, recovery]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-23"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-26"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Live AirVPN downloads; qBittorrent state/defaults and AirVPN WireGuard secrets not yet added to encrypted off-host backups, 2026-10-26"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Backrest plan JSON, destination, key custody and no restore test, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
@@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ sources:
- stacks/vaultwarden/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/authentik/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/wardrowbe/docker-compose.yml
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.storage, home-server.portainer, home-server.authentication, home-server.operations]
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.downloads, home-server.storage, home-server.portainer, home-server.authentication, home-server.operations]
update_triggers: [backup-plan-change, destination-change, hook-change, credential-change, restore-test]
unknowns:
- last-successful-backup-and-repository-check
@@ -74,6 +76,21 @@ Case-insensitive exclusions: `/userdata/gitea/gitea/packages`,
`excludes: []`; CLI `--skip-if-unchanged` supplied despite
plan `skipIfUnchanged: false`. Unchanged runs may create no snapshot.
### Local-downloads recovery gap
The owner confirms on 2026-10-26 that the live [AirVPN download stack](downloads.md)
has **not** yet been added to encrypted off-host backups. Missing recovery state:
`/data/qbittorrent/config` (settings/torrent state),
`/data/qbittorrent/defaults` (defaults and startup/resolver files), and
`/data/gluetun/secrets` (WireGuard private/preshared keys). The reserved peer
port, tunnel address and server-country settings also need recoverable
deployment configuration; no secret values belong in these notes.
Torrent payloads and media libraries remain outside the six-directory plan.
Hardlinks are not backups. Ultra.cc is retired and is no longer a remote
source to assume during recovery. Removing `rclone-seedbox.service` does not
remove Backrest's separate Google Drive/rclone dependency.
## Consistency hooks
Stop timeout `120s`; chains use `&&`. Errors: `ON_ERROR_FATAL`,
+38 -3
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@@ -4,8 +4,21 @@ id: home-server.deployment
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, portainer, github, stack-deployment, secrets]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-18"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-26"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "AirVPN local downloads and public authenticated qBittorrent UI live; Ultra.cc/rclone retired; encrypted download-state/secret backups not yet added, 2026-10-26"
- kind: repository
repository: jupiter-stacks
revision: working-tree
base_revision: 631e4fdfa4c7122e5eff38e11b070c17ff7a4a2a
paths:
- stacks/downloads/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/downloads/README.md
- stacks/sonarr/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/radarr/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/prowlarr/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/traefik/docker-compose.yml
- kind: repository
repository: jupiter-stacks
revision: 026cfa58b601165342b278401183c5fed5a50db2
@@ -31,7 +44,7 @@ sources:
- stacks/gitea/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/immich/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/paperless-ngx/docker-compose.yml
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.host, home-server.portainer, home-server.authentication, home-server.backups, home-server.operations, home-server.notes]
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.host, home-server.portainer, home-server.authentication, home-server.backups, home-server.operations, home-server.notes, home-server.downloads]
update_triggers: [deployment-workflow-change, repository-change, credential-rotation, rollback-policy-change]
unknowns:
- github-pat-scopes-and-expiration
@@ -45,7 +58,7 @@ unknowns:
| Stack definitions | <https://github.com/jayo60013/jupiter-stacks> |
| Git ref | `main` |
| Repository authentication | GitHub PAT configured in Portainer |
| Environment values/secrets | Portainer stack environment settings |
| Environment values/secrets | Portainer stack environment settings; AirVPN keys use root-restricted host secret files |
| Deployment | Manually pull/redeploy each affected stack in Portainer |
| Portainer itself | [Host shell script](portainer.md), not a managed Compose stack |
@@ -65,6 +78,28 @@ No independent recovery arrangement exists for the PAT or stack secrets.
Rollback, health-check gates, approval rules and UI-versus-Git drift policy
are not established; do not assume permission to deploy, stop or delete services.
## Local downloads deployment / recovery
The owner confirms [qBittorrent/Gluetun through AirVPN](downloads.md) live on
2026-10-26, including both Arr import workflows and the authenticated public UI.
Use the linked stack runbook for reconstruction, not the retired seedbox.
Deploy Downloads before its consumers: it creates the external `downloads`
network used by Sonarr, Radarr, Prowlarr and Traefik. Prepare the bind-mounted
files under `/data/qbittorrent/{config,defaults}` and
`/data/gluetun/secrets` first. AirVPN private/preshared keys are root-restricted
host files mounted as Compose secrets, not Portainer environment values;
the tunnel address, country and reserved peer port are stack environment values.
Arr client credentials, categories, library roots, remote-path mappings and
hardlink settings are database/UI state, not reproduced by pulling Compose.
The public UI also depends on the persisted qBittorrent Server domains setting,
the host-side Authentik blueprint and Traefik's `downloads` network attachment.
Recreate Gluetun and qBittorrent together when replacing their shared namespace.
Full isolation exercises remain outstanding, and the new client state/defaults
and VPN secrets are not yet backed up. See [Backups](backups.md#local-downloads-recovery-gap).
## Notes deployment
The [Notes reference](notes.md) covers `notes_builder`, `notes_web`, host bind
+169
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@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
---
schema_version: 1
id: home-server.downloads
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, airvpn, gluetun, qbittorrent, media-import]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-26"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Former Ultra.cc subscription active since 2024-05-25, always GBP 4.50/month until retirement, 2026-10-26"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "AirVPN live with direct home-ISP egress; Sonarr/Radarr imports, hardlinks and seeding/removal confirmed; public UI and both login layers working; Ultra.cc and rclone mount retired; remaining isolation checks and backups outstanding, 2026-10-26"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Cost saving and simpler architecture; three-year AirVPN plan purchased for GBP 56.06, expires Thursday, 25 October 2029, 2026-10-26"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Requested AirVPN/local qBittorrent migration with direct home-ISP egress, 2026-10-26"
- kind: repository
repository: jupiter-stacks
revision: working-tree
base_revision: 631e4fdfa4c7122e5eff38e11b070c17ff7a4a2a
paths:
- stacks/downloads/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/downloads/README.md
- stacks/downloads/qBittorrent.conf
- stacks/downloads/resolv.conf
- stacks/downloads/vpn-entrypoint.sh
- stacks/sonarr/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/radarr/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/prowlarr/docker-compose.yml
related: [home-server.seedbox, home-server.networking, home-server.storage, home-server.deployment, home-server.backups]
update_triggers: [deployment, airvpn-device-change, route-change, storage-change, seedbox-retirement]
unknowns:
- selected-airvpn-server-country-and-forwarded-port
- measured-throughput-and-runtime-isolation
- airvpn-renewal-behaviour
---
# Local downloads / AirVPN
**Live by owner report on 2026-10-26.** Local qBittorrent behind Gluetun/AirVPN
has replaced the [Ultra.cc seedbox](seedbox.md). Downloads use the home ISP
directly. Sonarr and Radarr imports, hardlinks, continued seeding and intended
removal behaviour are confirmed. Ultra.cc is cancelled/expired, retained files
have been handled, and the old rclone-seedbox service and FUSE mount are removed.
The change saves money and simplifies the architecture: downloads and libraries
now share local storage, removing the remote seedbox, SFTP/FUSE mount and
cross-filesystem import dependency. This is owner confirmation, not independent
runtime inspection; the remaining isolation and recovery gaps are listed below.
## Subscription / savings
| Item | Cost / term |
| --- | --- |
| Provider | [AirVPN](https://airvpn.org/); three-year plan purchased |
| Upfront payment | GBP 56.06 for three years |
| Expiry | **Thursday, 25 October 2029** |
| Effective subscription cost | Approximately GBP 1.56/month or GBP 18.69/year, amortised over 36 months |
| Former Ultra.cc subscription | Active since 2024-05-25 until retirement; always GBP 4.50/month (GBP 54/year), with no price changes |
| Subscription saving | Approximately GBP 2.94/month or GBP 35.31/year; GBP 105.94 over three years at the former rate |
Savings exclude incremental electricity and any future renewal price.
Automatic renewal behaviour has not been recorded.
The authoritative deployment and rollback runbook is
[`jupiter-stacks/stacks/downloads/README.md`](https://github.com/jayo60013/jupiter-stacks/blob/main/stacks/downloads/README.md).
It includes the required host files, AirVPN setup, routing acceptance gates,
failure exercises, application UI changes and seedbox retirement.
## Current topology
```text
qBittorrent
-> shared Gluetun network namespace / firewall
-> AirVPN WireGuard packets over Jupiter's home interface/router
-> AirVPN public exit
-> peers
Sonarr / Radarr / optional Prowlarr direct downloads
-> dedicated downloads Docker network
-> http://gluetun:8080
```
The existing Jupiter-to-Mercury host WireGuard tunnel remains separate and
unchanged. Direct home-ISP egress, not Mercury, is confirmed by the owner.
Recheck host routing and packet-marking rules after network or endpoint changes.
## Repository configuration
| Surface | Configuration |
| --- | --- |
| Downloads stack | Pinned Gluetun and LinuxServer qBittorrent images in one Compose project |
| Egress isolation | qBittorrent uses `network_mode: service:gluetun`; enabled Gluetun firewall; initial torrent interface binding `wg0` |
| Startup | Compose health dependency plus a per-start entrypoint guard before qBittorrent's original `/init`, including Docker automatic restarts |
| DNS / IPv6 | qBittorrent resolver pinned to Gluetun localhost; namespace IPv6 disabled |
| Administration | HTTPS `qbittorrent.umbra.mom` via Traefik/Authentik direct user bindings + MFA and qBittorrent login; loopback/SSH fallback retained |
| Client API | `gluetun:8080` on the named `downloads` bridge; application authentication retained |
| Peer ingress | AirVPN-reserved TCP/UDP port allowed through the VPN firewall; no host/router publication |
| Secrets | Root-restricted files under `/data/gluetun/secrets`, mounted only into Gluetun |
Prowlarr and FlareSolverr indexer traffic is not moved behind AirVPN. Sonarr,
Radarr and Prowlarr retain their ordinary networks and internet routes.
## Public monitoring
Public access and both authentication layers are working by owner report.
`https://qbittorrent.umbra.mom` uses Mercury's existing wildcard ingress, then
Traefik and Authentik's per-user/MFA policy before qBittorrent's own login.
This is the normal management UI, not a read-only monitoring account.
Traefik joins the existing `downloads` network to reach `gluetun:8080`;
Gluetun and qBittorrent gain no independent network or non-VPN egress path.
The router labels belong to Gluetun, which owns the shared namespace.
The Authentik blueprint adds an application bound to `jay` (with other users
assigned manually), a `forward_single`
provider, and embedded-outpost membership; its callback router includes the
new hostname.
For recovery or redeployment, follow the runbook's public-monitoring sequence:
update the persisted qBittorrent Server domains setting, apply the host-side Authentik blueprint and
redeploy Authentik, then Traefik and the Downloads pair. Merely changing the
qBittorrent defaults does not update a running installation. Retain native
authentication and CSRF/host protections; do not expose an unauthenticated API.
DNS must resolve the public hostname to Mercury, not to an AirVPN exit.
Sonarr/Radarr/Prowlarr keep using the internal API. Only browser ingress uses
Mercury; torrent internet traffic still uses AirVPN through the home ISP.
## Local storage and imports
Existing host libraries stay at `/data/jellyfin/movies` and
`/data/jellyfin/tv_shows`. New downloads live under
`/data/jellyfin/torrents/{incomplete,movies,tv}`.
Sonarr/Radarr receive one `/data/jellyfin:/media` mount so imports can hardlink
within one filesystem. The replacement library roots are `/media/tv_shows`
and `/media/movies`, rather than `/tv` and `/movies`, without moving
existing host files. Jellyfin's existing `/data/jellyfin:/media` mount stays
unchanged; download folders must not be included in its library roots.
qBittorrent receives only `/data/jellyfin/torrents:/media/torrents`, not the
organised media libraries. All three applications see reported download paths
consistently. Repository/runbook categories are `sonarr` and `radarr`, with their
corresponding download folders. Both applications' hardlink imports and intended
seeding/removal behaviour are confirmed by the owner.
Deploy Downloads before the consumer stacks: it creates their external
`downloads` network. Updating Compose does not change download-client settings,
categories, roots or remote-path mappings stored in application databases.
During recovery, restore or reconcile that state before resuming jobs.
The runbook's old-queue migration steps are historical now that Ultra.cc is retired.
## Remaining validation / recovery gaps
- Record the non-secret server country and reserved peer port if needed for
operations; never put device keys in these notes.
- Direct home-ISP egress and normal downloads are confirmed; working inbound
peer connectivity, DNS confinement and IPv6 denial are not yet fully recorded.
- Exercise tunnel failure, unavailable VPN at startup, Gluetun replacement and
host reboot; no unprotected internet fallback is acceptable.
- Add qBittorrent state/defaults and VPN secrets to the actual encrypted backup
policy; the owner confirms they are not yet covered. The documented
six-directory plan does not cover them.
Seedbox retirement and the local import workflow are complete by owner report;
the former seedbox is no longer an available rollback assumption.
The HDD array remains RAID 0 without redundancy. Hardlinks save space but are
not independent copies or backups.
+12 -5
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,10 @@ id: home-server.host
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, hardware, operating-system, docker]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-20"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-26"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "AirVPN local downloads live; Ultra.cc retired and rclone-seedbox service/FUSE mount removed, 2026-10-26"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Hardware, OS, bare-metal Docker and data-root confirmation, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
@@ -60,8 +62,9 @@ unknowns:
Docker/containerd services and `docker.socket` are enabled.
Docker starts `/usr/bin/dockerd -H fd:// --containerd=/run/containerd/containerd.sock`.
Supplied Docker unit has no explicit `/data` mount dependency or ordering against
`rclone-seedbox.service`.
Supplied Docker unit has no explicit `/data` mount dependency.
The former `rclone-seedbox.service` and FUSE mount are removed by owner report
on 2026-10-26; Docker workloads no longer depend on that remote import mount.
### Docker log rotation
@@ -101,8 +104,12 @@ docker inspect --format '{{json .HostConfig.LogConfig}}' CONTAINER
| `backup-puller` | UID/GID `1001:1001`; `/home/backup-puller`; bash; member of `backups`; origin/purpose not recognized by owner |
| `backups` | Shared group; GID `1002` |
WireGuard and rclone: apt-managed. `wg-quick@wg0.service` is active in the supplied
snapshot. No host-level nginx on Jupiter; nginx still exists in application
WireGuard and rclone were apt-managed in the supplied snapshot;
removing the seedbox service does not establish that the rclone package was
uninstalled. Backrest's separate rclone configuration is not the retired mount.
`wg-quick@wg0.service` is active in the supplied snapshot and remains separate
from the containerised Gluetun/AirVPN tunnel for [local downloads](downloads.md).
No host-level nginx on Jupiter; nginx still exists in application
containers. `unattended-upgrades.service` is enabled; effective update policy
not supplied.
+34 -34
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@@ -4,8 +4,10 @@ id: home-server.ideas-next-steps
type: plan
scope: [jupiter, mercury, private-access, recovery, downloads, power, services]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-22"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-26"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "AirVPN downloads live; GBP 56.06 three-year plan ending 2029-10-25; Ultra.cc/rclone retired; imports/hardlinks/seeding/removal and public UI confirmed; full isolation checks and backups outstanding, 2026-10-26"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Access, device-loss recovery, hardware constraints, broadband and VPN preferences interview, 2026-10-22"
- kind: documentation
@@ -17,6 +19,7 @@ related:
- home-server.backups
- home-server.operations
- home-server.seedbox
- home-server.downloads
- home-server.storage
- home-server.host
update_triggers: [implementation, priority-change, access-requirements-change, pricing-change, power-measurement]
@@ -24,16 +27,16 @@ unknowns:
- live-routing-firewall-and-wireguard-configuration
- work-laptop-local-dns-and-lan-access-policy
- measured-wall-power-and-electricity-tariff
- current-vpn-plan-features-and-pricing
- airvpn-renewal-terms-and-complete-isolation-results
- immich-original-photo-backup-coverage
---
# Ideas / next steps
Planning backlog from the 2026-10-22 discussion. These are recommendations and
owner preferences, **not implemented changes or deployment evidence**.
Existing reference pages describe the documented configuration; update them
when changes are actually deployed.
Planning backlog from the 2026-10-22 discussion, updated with the owner's
2026-10-26 AirVPN cutover confirmation. Unchecked proposals remain
**recommendations, not implemented changes**; the completed downloads work
below is owner-reported deployed state.
## Requirements confirmed with the owner
@@ -48,14 +51,14 @@ when changes are actually deployed.
| Private-access tooling | Prefer minimal infrastructure and no vendor-hosted coordination service; existing Cloudflare DNS/SSH use is acceptable |
| Hardware | Software/BIOS tuning only; no hardware purchases or removals |
| Broadband | Reported 500 Mbps download and upload; public trackers only |
| VPN candidates | Proton VPN or AirVPN; owner quotes GBP 2.50/month without upfront commitment; exact plan/features/pricing not independently checked |
| Download VPN | AirVPN selected and live; three-year plan purchased for GBP 56.06, expires Thursday, 25 October 2029 |
| New services | Interested in reliability, everyday tools, media, development and privacy |
## Priority order
1. Prepare independent recovery access, then introduce private admin ingress.
2. Make backups recoverable and add failure notifications.
3. Replace the seedbox with VPN-isolated local downloads if the trial succeeds.
3. Finish download-VPN isolation checks and recovery coverage; seedbox replacement is complete.
4. Measure and tune power use.
5. Add services that solve an actual day-to-day problem.
@@ -149,35 +152,32 @@ remains necessary. See [Backups](backups.md) and [Operations](operations.md).
## Local downloads instead of the seedbox
At the owner's quoted prices, replacing the GBP 4.50/month seedbox with a
GBP 2.50/month VPN saves **GBP 2/month or GBP 24/year before extra electricity**.
Confirm actual plan terms before purchasing. The simpler local storage/import
path may be more valuable than the modest subscription saving.
**Completed by owner report on 2026-10-26:**
[local qBittorrent/Gluetun downloads through AirVPN](downloads.md) are live.
This is both a **cost saving** and an **architecture simplification**: local
storage and hardlink imports replace the remote seedbox and SFTP/FUSE dependency.
### Proposed arrangement
The purchased **three-year AirVPN plan cost GBP 56.06** and expires
**Thursday, 25 October 2029**. Amortised over 36 months, that is approximately
GBP 1.56/month versus Ultra.cc's former GBP 4.50/month: a subscription saving of
**GBP 35.31/year**, or **GBP 105.94 over three years**, before extra electricity.
The former GBP 2.50/month VPN estimate is superseded by this actual purchase.
- [ ] Check the chosen Proton VPN/AirVPN plan supports P2P and the intended
manual/container connection; assess port forwarding for peer connectivity.
- [ ] Run qBittorrent behind a VPN gateway container such as Gluetun.
- [ ] Block torrent egress whenever the VPN is unavailable, including startup;
use qBittorrent interface binding as additional protection.
- [ ] Keep the qBittorrent Web UI private and ensure DNS/IPv6 cannot bypass
the intended VPN path.
- [ ] Keep the host, public applications and admin-access WireGuard routes on
their normal connections. The commercial download VPN is a separate job.
- [ ] Use a common container mount layout for downloads and media on the HDD
filesystem so Radarr/Sonarr can hardlink imports while torrents seed.
- [ ] Confirm imports, seeding, removal behaviour and VPN-failure isolation
before cancelling the seedbox.
- [ ] Migrate any retained downloads and remove the rclone/FUSE dependency only
after the replacement workflow works.
### Completed work and remaining follow-up
- [x] Deploy local qBittorrent behind Gluetun/AirVPN.
- [x] Confirm encrypted VPN egress uses the home ISP directly, not Mercury.
- [x] Confirm Sonarr and Radarr imports, hardlinks and intended seeding/removal.
- [x] Confirm public Web UI through Mercury/Traefik/Authentik plus native
qBittorrent login; this is an intentional change from the private-only proposal.
- [x] Retire Ultra.cc, handle retained files and remove the rclone-seedbox
service and FUSE mount.
- [ ] Complete peer-ingress, DNS/IPv6 leak and VPN-failure/startup/reboot checks.
- [ ] Add qBittorrent state/defaults and AirVPN secrets to encrypted off-host backups.
A hardlink gives the same file data two names without storing a second full
copy. The current separate download/library mounts need review; sharing physical
disks alone is not enough.
The [Seedbox](seedbox.md) notes record an expiry of 2026-10-25. Confirm renewal
status rather than assuming this snapshot is still the billing state.
copy. Hardlinks are confirmed for both import workflows; they are not backups.
The separate private-admin-access proposal above remains outstanding.
## Electricity and compute efficiency
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ Illustrative costs at **25p/kWh**, using 365 days/year divided by 12:
| 80 W | GBP 14.60 |
At that illustrative tariff, saving 10 W continuously saves about GBP 18/year.
An extra average draw of about 11 W would consume the GBP 2/month seedbox saving.
An extra average draw of about 16 W would consume the GBP 35.31/year subscription saving.
Count the incremental download workload, not the server's existing baseline.
- [ ] Measure wall power and obtain the actual unit rate when practical.
+8 -4
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@
schema_version: 1
id: home-server.reference
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, mercury, seedbox, shared-infrastructure]
scope: [jupiter, mercury, downloads, shared-infrastructure]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-22"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-26"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "AirVPN local downloads live, Ultra.cc/rclone retired; GBP 56.06 three-year plan ending 2029-10-25 for savings and simpler architecture, 2026-10-26"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Added ideas/next-steps planning page from owner discussion, 2026-10-22"
- kind: owner-report
@@ -16,6 +18,7 @@ related:
- home-server.host
- home-server.mercury
- home-server.seedbox
- home-server.downloads
- home-server.portainer
- home-server.deployment
- home-server.notes
@@ -35,14 +38,15 @@ unknowns: []
| --- | --- |
| [Host](host.md) | Jupiter hardware; OS; Docker |
| [Mercury VPS](mercury.md) | Hosting; ingress; WireGuard; firewall |
| [Seedbox](seedbox.md) | Ultra.cc; qBittorrent; rclone mount |
| [Local downloads / AirVPN](downloads.md) | Live qBittorrent/Gluetun; local hardlink imports; three-year plan GBP 56.06, expires Thursday, 25 October 2029 |
| [Seedbox (retired)](seedbox.md) | Historical Ultra.cc setup; subscription and rclone/FUSE mount retired |
| [Portainer](portainer.md) | Script-managed container; state; backups |
| [Deployment](deployment.md) | GitHub; Portainer; environment values |
| [Notes](notes.md) | Webhook builder; static site; networks; deployment order |
| [Operations / decisions](operations.md) | Tradeoffs; monitoring; recovery gaps |
| [Networking](networking.md) | Mercury; WireGuard; DNS; ingress |
| [Storage](storage.md) | SSD; RAID 0; mounts; volumes |
| [Authentication](authentication.md) | Authentik; OIDC; access groups; forward-auth; secrets |
| [Authentication](authentication.md) | Authentik; OIDC; per-user service access; forward-auth; secrets |
| [Backups](backups.md) | Backrest; coverage; retention; recovery |
| [Ideas / next steps](ideas-next-steps.md) | Proposed private access, recovery, savings and optional services; not deployed state |
+70 -37
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,19 @@
schema_version: 1
id: home-server.networking
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, mercury, seedbox, dns, ingress, wireguard, cloudflare, sftp]
scope: [jupiter, mercury, airvpn, downloads, dns, ingress, wireguard, cloudflare]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-16"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-26"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "AirVPN local downloads and direct home-ISP egress live; public qBittorrent UI and both authentication layers working; Ultra.cc/rclone mount retired; full failure/leak checks outstanding, 2026-10-26"
- kind: repository
repository: jupiter-stacks
revision: working-tree
base_revision: 631e4fdfa4c7122e5eff38e11b070c17ff7a4a2a
paths:
- stacks/downloads/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/traefik/docker-compose.yml
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Network topology, Mercury nginx/iptables/fail2ban output, LAN DNS, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
@@ -31,7 +40,7 @@ sources:
paths:
- stacks/authentik/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.host, home-server.mercury, home-server.seedbox, home-server.authentication, home-server.operations]
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.host, home-server.mercury, home-server.downloads, home-server.seedbox, home-server.authentication, home-server.operations]
update_triggers: [dns-change, proxy-change, tunnel-change, firewall-change, certificate-change, seedbox-change]
unknowns:
- public-dns-record-types-and-cloudflare-proxy-status
@@ -39,12 +48,26 @@ unknowns:
- wireguard-allowedips-and-keepalive
- jupiter-firewall-policy
- traefik-forwarded-header-trust-configuration
- seedbox-sftp-port-and-download-client-api-endpoint
- complete-airvpn-failure-dns-and-ipv6-isolation-results
---
# Networking
## HTTPS ingress / seedbox connectivity
## AirVPN downloads
[VPN-isolated local downloads](downloads.md) are live by owner report on
2026-10-26. Gluetun connects directly to AirVPN through the home ISP, separate
from the existing Mercury tunnel. Ultra.cc and the rclone/FUSE mount are retired.
This cuts subscription costs and removes the remote-storage/import dependency.
Full failure, DNS and IPv6 isolation checks are still outstanding.
Public monitoring at `qbittorrent.umbra.mom` is working: Mercury's wildcard
HTTPS ingress reaches Traefik, which joins `downloads` and applies Authentik
per-user/MFA protection before proxying to `gluetun:8080`. The outpost callback
hostname is registered separately. This does not route torrent egress through
Mercury; see the [public-monitoring deployment steps](downloads.md#public-monitoring).
## HTTPS ingress / local downloads
```mermaid
---
@@ -78,27 +101,32 @@ flowchart TB
Traefik["<b>Traefik</b><br/>192.168.1.56<br/>WireGuard 10.0.0.2"]
Apps["<b>Application containers</b><br/>Docker network: traefik"]
Arr["<b>Radarr / Sonarr</b><br/>Download control / media imports"]
Rclone["<b>Host rclone / FUSE</b><br/>/mnt/seedbox"]
Qbit["<b>qBittorrent</b><br/>Shared Gluetun namespace"]
Gluetun["<b>Gluetun</b><br/>WireGuard / firewall<br/>downloads Docker network"]
Downloads["<b>Local torrents / libraries</b><br/>/data/jellyfin<br/>Hardlink imports"]
Router["<b>Home router / ISP</b><br/>Encrypted VPN underlay"]
LAN -->|"HTTPS :443"| Traefik
Traefik -->|"Application routing"| Apps
Traefik -->|"Media management UIs"| Arr
Arr -->|"/downloads bind / host /mnt/seedbox"| Rclone
end
subgraph Seed["ULTRA.CC / SEEDBOX"]
Qbit["<b>qBittorrent</b><br/>jayo60013.terra.usbx.me"]
Downloads["<b>Remote download storage</b><br/>terra.usbx.me<br/>downloads/qbittorrent"]
Traefik -->|"Authentik + qBittorrent login / :8080"| Gluetun
Gluetun -->|"Web UI / API"| Qbit
Arr -->|"downloads network / gluetun:8080"| Gluetun
Arr -->|"Local hardlink imports"| Downloads
Qbit -->|"Writes downloads"| Downloads
Qbit -->|"VPN-only torrent traffic"| Gluetun
Gluetun -->|"Encrypted AirVPN WireGuard"| Router
end
AirVPN["<b>AirVPN</b><br/>Public VPN exit / reserved peer port"]
Peers["<b>Torrent peers</b>"]
Internet -->|"HTTPS :443"| Nginx
Nginx -->|"HTTPS :443 over WireGuard"| Traefik
Arr -->|"qBittorrent API / endpoint unconfirmed"| Qbit
Rclone -->|"Outbound SFTP / remote file access"| Downloads
Router -->|"Home ISP / not Mercury"| AirVPN
AirVPN <-->|"Torrent traffic"| Peers
class Internet,LAN infraClient
class Nginx,Traefik infraEdge
class Apps,Uptime,Arr,Rclone,Qbit,Downloads infraService
class Internet,LAN,Peers infraClient
class Nginx,Traefik,Router,AirVPN infraEdge
class Apps,Uptime,Arr,Gluetun,Qbit,Downloads infraService
```
## Cloudflare Tunnel
@@ -185,28 +213,27 @@ Ingress source: host `/data/cloudflared/config.yaml`, mounted at
| `bookshelf.local.umbra.mom` | Jupiter `192.168.1.56` |
| `ssh.umbra.mom`, `git.umbra.mom` | Cloudflare Tunnel |
| `uptime.umbra.mom` | Mercury nginx -> `http://127.0.0.1:3001` |
| `terra.usbx.me` | Ultra.cc seedbox; rclone SFTP remote |
| `jayo60013.terra.usbx.me` | Provider-hosted qBittorrent UI under `/qbittorrent/` |
| `qbittorrent.umbra.mom` | Mercury -> Traefik -> Authentik -> Gluetun/qBittorrent `8080`; native login retained |
| `gluetun:8080` | Internal authenticated qBittorrent API on the `downloads` Docker network |
## Seedbox connection
## Download connectivity
The [Ultra.cc seedbox](seedbox.md) runs qBittorrent on `terra.usbx.me`, separate
from Jupiter and Mercury. Its provider-hosted UI is
<https://jayo60013.terra.usbx.me/qbittorrent/>.
qBittorrent now runs on Jupiter in Gluetun's network namespace. The enabled
Gluetun firewall and qBittorrent's `wg0` binding are configured for VPN-only
torrent egress. AirVPN's reserved peer port is allowed through the VPN firewall,
not published on Jupiter or forwarded on the home router. Working downloads
alone do not demonstrate inbound peer reachability or failure isolation.
Jupiter's host-level `rclone-seedbox.service` initiates an outbound SFTP
connection to `terra.usbx.me`, user `jayo60013`, using
`/home/jay/.ssh/id_ed25519`. Remote `seedbox:downloads/qbittorrent` is exposed
through FUSE at `/mnt/seedbox`, then bind-mounted at `/downloads` in Radarr
and Sonarr. File reads use this mount; download control/removal uses qBittorrent's
API, not deletion through rclone. The exact configured download-client API
endpoint and SFTP port were not supplied; do not infer them from the UI URL.
Sonarr/Radarr and optional Prowlarr direct downloads use `gluetun:8080` with
native qBittorrent credentials, not the public Authentik-protected URL.
Their ordinary internet routes and Prowlarr/FlareSolverr indexer traffic remain
outside AirVPN. The Web UI also has a loopback-only `127.0.0.1:8080` publication
for private SSH forwarding.
This is not a WebDAV mount, scheduled sync, or Mercury/WireGuard/Cloudflare
Tunnel ingress route. No home-router port forwarding is required for Jupiter's
outbound SFTP connection. Remote availability and the host mount are dependencies
for media imports; startup ordering relative to Docker remains unconfirmed.
See [Storage](storage.md) for remote versus local media placement.
Imports now use local storage and hardlinks, not SFTP/FUSE. The former
[Seedbox](seedbox.md) page is historical; its service and mount are removed.
See [Storage](storage.md) for current placement and
[Local downloads](downloads.md) for the runbook and remaining checks.
## Mercury
@@ -236,6 +263,11 @@ An internal network alone does not isolate a multi-network container from
egress through its other networks. Empty network entries do not establish
whether they are obsolete or safe to remove.
The newer `downloads` bridge is defined with IPv6 disabled and is not internal.
Gluetun, Traefik, Sonarr, Radarr and Prowlarr attach to it; qBittorrent shares
Gluetun's namespace rather than joining independently. Its subnet was not
recorded. This supplements, rather than re-inspects, the older table.
## Jupiter: repository configuration
- Traefik publishes TCP `80,443`; HTTP redirects to HTTPS.
@@ -252,11 +284,12 @@ whether they are obsolete or safe to remove.
[Authentik](authentication.md) serves `auth.umbra.mom` through Traefik to
`authentik-server:9000`; the server joins the external `traefik` network.
The ingress diagrams show transport, not a universal authentication gate.
Seven applications use native OIDC; Backrest, Notes, Prowlarr, Radarr and Sonarr
Native OIDC integrations are listed on the authentication page; Backrest, Notes,
Prowlarr, Radarr, Sonarr and qBittorrent
use Traefik middleware `authentik@docker` and the embedded outpost.
Dozzle (`logs.umbra.mom`) now uses OIDC, not forward-auth.
On the five proxy-protected hostnames, a priority-1000
On the six proxy-protected hostnames, a priority-1000
`/outpost.goauthentik.io/` route goes straight to Authentik without forward-auth
to handle callbacks. Other application requests use their normal routers.
The middleware trusts forwarded headers; this is not evidence that the wider
+20 -3
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,10 @@ id: home-server.operations
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, mercury, design-decisions, monitoring, recovery]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-23"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-26"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "AirVPN local downloads live, Ultra.cc/rclone retired; cost saving and simpler architecture; GBP 56.06 three-year plan ends 2029-10-25; imports/hardlinks confirmed, full isolation checks and backups outstanding, 2026-10-26"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "RAID/media tradeoff, CGNAT/public IPv4 rationale, no alerting and running monitoring/log containers, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
@@ -14,7 +16,7 @@ sources:
reference: "OIDC and three-group motivation; Authentik fully deployed and Authelia retired; updated six-directory backup plan; independent recovery custody unchanged, 2026-10-16"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Notifications received in Discord server Jupiter: Beszel in #beszel-alerts, Backrest in #backrest-alerts, and Mercury Uptime Kuma in #uptimekuma-alerts, 2026-10-23"
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.host, home-server.mercury, home-server.networking, home-server.storage, home-server.authentication, home-server.backups, home-server.deployment]
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.host, home-server.mercury, home-server.downloads, home-server.networking, home-server.storage, home-server.authentication, home-server.backups, home-server.deployment]
update_triggers: [data-priority-change, architecture-change, alerting-change, recovery-test]
unknowns:
- acceptable-data-loss-and-recovery-order-by-service
@@ -34,8 +36,9 @@ unknowns:
| Back up important state | Six application directories covered, subject to exclusions; media redundancy is not the objective |
| Mercury public edge | Static public IPv4; home ISP uses CGNAT |
| No residential public ingress | Owner preference to avoid exposing the home IP |
| AirVPN instead of Ultra.cc | Live local downloads reduce cost and simplify architecture: no remote seedbox or SFTP/FUSE import dependency; GBP 56.06 prepaid for three years, expires Thursday, 25 October 2029 |
| Authentik instead of Authelia | Native OIDC rather than only forward-auth; retain forward-auth where needed |
| Three access categories | Admin: owner only, server health/operations; Developers: development services such as Gitea/Portainer; Clients: useful end-user services such as Wardrowbe/Paperless |
| Application access | 2026-10-26: replace the former Admin/Developers/Clients groups with manual per-user service bindings; keep `jay` as administrator with access to every configured application; repository prepared, deployment unconfirmed |
RAID 0 still stores important state alongside media: either HDD failure loses
the array; recovery depends on working backups. Owner intent is not evidence
@@ -46,6 +49,20 @@ Exact repository group names, app assignments and MFA policy are in
[Authentication](authentication.md). Group access is not the same as application
administrator privileges or Authentik superuser status.
## Download migration
[Local downloads](downloads.md) are live by owner report on 2026-10-26.
Direct home-ISP egress, both Arr hardlink imports, seeding/removal and the public
UI's Authentik plus qBittorrent login are confirmed. Ultra.cc is
cancelled/expired, retained files are handled and the old mount/service removed.
The subscription saving is approximately GBP 35.31/year before incremental
electricity, compared with the former GBP 4.50/month seedbox.
Remaining operational work: complete peer-ingress, DNS/IPv6 and
VPN-failure/startup/reboot isolation checks, and back up qBittorrent state/defaults
and AirVPN secrets. Normal successful downloads do not prove fail-closed behaviour.
The retired seedbox must not be assumed available for rollback.
## Observability
| Facility | Current configuration |
+4 -2
View File
@@ -53,8 +53,10 @@ establish local DNS resolution.
Native OIDC through [Authentik](authentication.md); client ID `portainer`;
issuer `https://auth.umbra.mom/application/o/portainer/`.
Both public and local HTTPS hostnames are registered as strict callbacks.
Application access requires Authentik group `development` (owner's Developers
category); this does not itself assign Portainer administrator permissions.
The updated Authentik blueprint grants `jay` direct access, with other users
assigned manually per application instead of through the retired `development`
group. Deployment of this access-policy migration is unconfirmed. Admission
does not itself assign Portainer administrator permissions.
OAuth configuration is database/UI state, not configured by the container
startup script. The owner reports the integration complete; local-login and
+25 -4
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,12 @@ id: home-server.seedbox
type: reference
scope: [seedbox, ultra-cc, qbittorrent, rclone, sftp, media-import]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-06"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-26"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Ultra.cc subscription active from 2024-05-25 until retirement, always GBP 4.50/month with no price changes, 2026-10-26"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Ultra.cc cancelled/expired, retained files handled, rclone-seedbox service and mount removed; local AirVPN downloads live, 2026-10-26"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Ultra.cc plan, remaining capacity, rclone remote/process and enabled systemd unit, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
@@ -22,7 +26,7 @@ sources:
paths:
- stacks/radarr/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/sonarr/docker-compose.yml
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.networking, home-server.storage, home-server.backups]
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.downloads, home-server.networking, home-server.storage, home-server.backups]
update_triggers: [hosting-renewal, quota-change, remote-change, mount-change, media-import-change]
unknowns:
- total-traffic-allowance-and-reset-period
@@ -35,9 +39,26 @@ unknowns:
- seedbox-backup-policy
---
# Seedbox
# Seedbox (retired)
## Service / subscription
**Retired by owner report on 2026-10-26:** Ultra.cc is cancelled/expired,
retained files have been handled, and Jupiter's `rclone-seedbox.service` and
`/mnt/seedbox` FUSE mount are removed. The replacement is
[local qBittorrent through AirVPN](downloads.md), now live with working
Sonarr/Radarr hardlink imports and seeding/removal.
The change reduces subscription cost and simplifies the architecture by removing
remote storage and the SFTP/FUSE import dependency. AirVPN cost GBP 56.06 for
three years, ending **Thursday, 25 October 2029**, versus Ultra.cc's former
GBP 4.50/month.
The Ultra.cc subscription had been active since **2024-05-25**, always at
**GBP 4.50/month**, with no price changes before retirement.
Everything below is a **historical 2026-10-06 snapshot**, retained for reference,
not current service state or a service to recreate.
## Former service / subscription
| Field | Configuration |
| --- | --- |
+54 -35
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,20 @@
schema_version: 1
id: home-server.storage
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, seedbox, disks, raid, filesystems, docker-volumes, remote-storage]
scope: [jupiter, downloads, disks, raid, filesystems, docker-volumes, media-import]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-16"
last_reviewed: "2026-10-26"
sources:
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Local AirVPN downloads live; Sonarr/Radarr imports, hardlinks and seeding/removal confirmed; retained seedbox files handled and rclone service/mount removed; download-state backups not yet added, 2026-10-26"
- kind: repository
repository: jupiter-stacks
revision: working-tree
base_revision: 631e4fdfa4c7122e5eff38e11b070c17ff7a4a2a
paths:
- stacks/downloads/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/sonarr/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/radarr/docker-compose.yml
- kind: owner-report
reference: "lsblk filesystem output, RAID level, mount placement and Docker data root, 2026-10-06"
- kind: owner-report
@@ -25,13 +35,18 @@ sources:
- stacks/authentik/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/wardrowbe/docker-compose.yml
- stacks/traefik/docker-compose.yml
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.host, home-server.seedbox, home-server.portainer, home-server.backups, home-server.operations]
related: [home-server.reference, home-server.host, home-server.downloads, home-server.seedbox, home-server.portainer, home-server.backups, home-server.operations]
update_triggers: [disk-change, raid-change, mount-change, volume-change, backup-coverage-change, seedbox-change]
unknowns: [persistent-mdadm-config-and-initramfs-content, disk-health]
---
# Storage
[AirVPN/local downloads](downloads.md) are live by owner report on 2026-10-26.
Downloads and libraries now share local storage, with Sonarr/Radarr hardlink
imports and seeding/removal confirmed. Existing host library paths are unchanged.
The Ultra.cc service and rclone/FUSE mount are retired, simplifying imports.
```mermaid
---
config:
@@ -52,14 +67,14 @@ config:
rankSpacing: 45
---
flowchart LR
subgraph Remote["ULTRA.CC / SEEDBOX"]
SEED[("<b>terra.usbx.me</b><br/>1001 GB allocation<br/>downloads/qbittorrent")]
end
subgraph Import["JUPITER / REMOTE MEDIA IMPORT"]
MOUNT["<b>/mnt/seedbox</b><br/>rclone / SFTP / FUSE<br/>Not a local replica"]
ARR["<b>Radarr / Sonarr</b><br/>Container /downloads"]
MOUNT -->|"Bind-mounted download source"| ARR
subgraph Import["JUPITER / LOCAL MEDIA IMPORT"]
QBIT["<b>qBittorrent</b><br/>Gluetun / AirVPN"]
TORRENTS[("<b>/data/jellyfin/torrents</b><br/>incomplete / movies / tv")]
ARR["<b>Radarr / Sonarr</b><br/>/data/jellyfin mounted at /media"]
LIBRARY[("<b>/data/jellyfin</b><br/>movies / tv_shows libraries")]
QBIT -->|"Writes /media/torrents"| TORRENTS
TORRENTS -->|"Local download source"| ARR
ARR -->|"Hardlink imports / same filesystem"| LIBRARY
end
subgraph Array["HDD ARRAY / APPLICATION DATA"]
@@ -88,41 +103,41 @@ flowchart LR
ROOT --> CACHE
end
SEED -->|"Remote reads / SFTP via rclone"| MOUNT
ARR -->|"Import to /data/jellyfin/movies or tv_shows"| DATA
DATA -->|"Backs torrent storage"| TORRENTS
DATA -->|"Backs organised libraries"| LIBRARY
class A,B,SSD,DATA,ROOT,SEED infraStorage
class A,B,SSD,DATA,ROOT,TORRENTS,LIBRARY infraStorage
class RAID infraCloud
class EFI,SWAP infraClient
class DOCKER,CACHE,MOUNT,ARR infraService
class DOCKER,CACHE,QBIT,ARR infraService
```
RAID 0: striping; no redundancy; either HDD failure loses the array.
## Seedbox storage / imports
## Local downloads / imports
The [Ultra.cc seedbox](seedbox.md) is separate remote storage, not part of
Jupiter's RAID or SSD. Host `terra.usbx.me`, plan `Lancer-v2`: 1001 GB allocation,
984 GB available in the supplied 2026-10-06 snapshot.
The current path is entirely on Jupiter's HDD array:
```text
/home/jayo60013/downloads/qbittorrent (seedbox)
-> rclone remote seedbox:downloads/qbittorrent
-> /mnt/seedbox (Jupiter SFTP/FUSE mount)
-> /downloads (Radarr / Sonarr bind mount)
-> /data/jellyfin/{movies,tv_shows} (imported library on HDD array)
qBittorrent -> /data/jellyfin/torrents/{incomplete,movies,tv}
-> Sonarr/Radarr via /data/jellyfin:/media
-> hardlinks in /data/jellyfin/{movies,tv_shows}
```
`rclone-seedbox.service` manages the mount; it is not a scheduled sync or full
local replica. `--vfs-cache-mode writes` streams read-only opens; the cache
location and size limit are unconfirmed. Cross-filesystem hardlinks to the
local libraries are impossible. Host remounts do not automatically propagate
through the containers' `rprivate` binds.
Sonarr's library root is `/media/tv_shows`; Radarr's is `/media/movies`.
qBittorrent receives only the torrents subtree at `/media/torrents`, not the
organised libraries. Jellyfin retains `/data/jellyfin:/media`; its library roots
must exclude the torrent folders.
The six-directory Backrest plan does not cover the seedbox or media libraries;
the provider's own backup policy is unknown. FUSE-reported capacity does not
establish the account quota. Import/removal behaviour and mount details remain
documented on the [Seedbox](seedbox.md) page.
Hardlinks let imported files remain available while torrents seed without a
second full data copy. Removing one name does not remove the data while another
link remains; hardlinks are not independent copies or backups. The old remote
mount could not support cross-filesystem hardlinks to the local libraries.
The six-directory Backrest plan does not cover media, torrent data, qBittorrent
state/defaults or VPN secrets. The owner confirms the latter recovery gap
remains. Historical remote storage details are on [Seedbox (retired)](seedbox.md);
retained files are handled and its mount/service are removed.
## Filesystems
@@ -166,14 +181,18 @@ UUID=4781ea5d-fba5-438d-8d97-6a0801669ca1 none swap sw 0 0
```
Observed `/data`: `rw,relatime,stripe=256`; `/tmp`: tmpfs.
Seedbox FUSE mount is service-managed, not listed in fstab.
The former seedbox FUSE mount was service-managed, not listed in fstab; it has
now been removed.
## Placement
| Host path | Backing / purpose |
| --- | --- |
| `/data/<service>` | HDD array; service bind mounts |
| `/mnt/seedbox` | Remote SFTP/FUSE mount; [seedbox](seedbox.md); not a local replica |
| `/data/jellyfin/torrents/{incomplete,movies,tv}` | HDD array; local qBittorrent downloads |
| `/data/jellyfin/{movies,tv_shows}` | HDD array; organised media libraries; hardlink imports |
| `/data/qbittorrent/{config,defaults}` | HDD array; client state and startup defaults/scripts; not backed up |
| `/data/gluetun/secrets` | HDD array; root-restricted AirVPN WireGuard secrets; not backed up |
| `/home/jay/data/backrest/cache` | SSD; Backrest cache |
| `/home/jay/data/jellyfin/cache` | SSD; Jellyfin cache |
| `/var/lib/docker` | SSD; Docker state and default local named volumes |
+2 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ nav = [
{ "Reference" = "home-server/index.md" },
{ "Host" = "home-server/host.md" },
{ "Mercury VPS" = "home-server/mercury.md" },
{ "Seedbox" = "home-server/seedbox.md" },
{ "Local downloads / AirVPN" = "home-server/downloads.md" },
{ "Seedbox (retired)" = "home-server/seedbox.md" },
{ "Portainer" = "home-server/portainer.md" },
{ "Deployment" = "home-server/deployment.md" },
{ "Notes" = "home-server/notes.md" },