14 KiB
schema_version, id, type, scope, sensitivity, last_reviewed, sources, related, update_triggers, unknowns
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| 1 | home-server.authentication | reference |
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private-infrastructure | 2026-10-26 |
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Authentication
Authentik replaces Authelia. The original setup used native OIDC and forward-auth
with three access groups. On 2026-10-26 the owner requested direct per-user
service access instead; the repository now prepares that migration, with jay
allowed into every configured application. Deployment is unconfirmed.
The owner reports the earlier Authentik migration
fully deployed as of 2026-10-16 and Authelia retired. Homarr OIDC login was
reported working on 2026-10-18; linking to the existing account is configured
in the repository but has not been confirmed successful.
Configuration details below are repository evidence, not live inspection.
| Component | Configuration |
|---|---|
| Portal | https://auth.umbra.mom |
| Identity service | Authentik server + worker; image 2026.8.4 |
| Database | PostgreSQL 16; database/user authentik |
| Configuration | stacks/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml; worker-mounted custom blueprint |
| Application MFA | jupiter-app-authorization; TOTP or WebAuthn; prompts for setup if none configured |
| Recent MFA | Five-minute reuse threshold avoids an immediate duplicate challenge |
| Host setup access | Loopback 127.0.0.1:9000 -> server 9000 |
Per-user application access
Every one of the 15 configured applications has a direct binding for the
existing Authentik user jay, at order 0. Applications use
policy_engine_mode: any: Jay or another explicitly added user may pass.
Unassigned users are denied, and the shared application-MFA flow remains.
The blueprint does not create users or change passwords, MFA devices or
application-native administrator roles.
Add other users in the application's Policy / Group / User Bindings tab,
using a User binding with order 10 or higher, enabled and not negated.
Keep ANY mode and retain Jay's order-0 binding. Manual bindings at other orders
are not removed by blueprint reapplication. Admission does not itself grant
administrator privileges inside a service.
The blueprint deletes only the custom admins, development and clients
groups after replacing their bindings; their memberships and group-based grants
are removed. Retain Jay's built-in superuser group membership, normally
authentik Admins: Authentik derives administrator status from a superuser
group, so removing every group would lock out administration.
Before applying, back up Authentik, confirm Jay is still a superuser, and redeploy
Trek with its username-based admin mapping. Copy the updated blueprint into the
host's /data/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml and apply it, then individually
assign the other users you want to retain. See the
access-management runbook
for rollout and rollback. Existing application sessions/API keys need separate
revocation when removing access.
Native OIDC
Each client uses a confidential authorization-code provider, strict redirect URIs,
per-provider issuer and the shared application-MFA authorization flow.
Issuer pattern: https://auth.umbra.mom/application/o/<client-id>/.
| Client ID | Application hostname | Integration configuration |
|---|---|---|
beszel |
beszel.umbra.mom |
Database/UI provider; password-auth disable flag in Compose |
dozzle |
logs.umbra.mom |
Compose OIDC settings; no forward-auth middleware |
gitea |
gitea.umbra.mom |
Database/UI authentication source; Compose requires login for account linking and disables automatic registration |
homarr |
umbra.mom |
Compose OIDC settings; Authentik-only login configured; verified-email linking to existing password accounts enabled |
immich |
photos.umbra.mom |
Database/UI OAuth settings; web and mobile callbacks registered |
paperless |
paperless.umbra.mom |
Compose OpenID Connect/allauth configuration; PKCE enabled; signups disabled |
portainer |
portainer.umbra.mom, portainer.local.umbra.mom |
Database/UI OAuth settings; both callback hosts registered |
trek |
holidays.umbra.mom |
Compose OIDC settings; preferred_username == jay grants the app admin role |
wardrowbe |
wardrobe.umbra.mom |
Compose OIDC settings for frontend and backend/workers |
Dozzle's custom profile mapping emits dozzle_roles: ["none"] for any user
admitted by its direct application bindings. Its Docker proxy stays read-only.
The email mapping asserts email_verified only when the user has
an email and their email_verified attribute is explicitly true.
OIDC integration does not prove local password login is disabled or application roles are synchronized. Beszel and Paperless retain migration-safe local-login defaults in Compose; deployed overrides and account-linking details were not supplied. Application permissions and existing sessions remain app-managed.
Homarr
Homarr uses native OIDC, not a Traefik forward-auth gate. Its Authentik provider
is jupiter-homarr, with the shared application-MFA flow.
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Login providers | AUTH_PROVIDERS=oidc (Authentik only) |
| Issuer | https://auth.umbra.mom/application/o/homarr/ |
| Client ID / display name | homarr / Authentik |
| Callback | https://umbra.mom/api/auth/callback/oidc (strict match) |
| Requested scopes | openid email profile |
| Client secret | OIDC_HOMARR_SECRET in both the Homarr and Authentik stack environments |
| Existing-account linking | AUTH_OIDC_ENABLE_DANGEROUS_CREDENTIALS_LINKING=true |
An OIDC login initially created a separate user instead of signing into the
existing jay password account. Linking is now enabled in Compose; it matches
email addresses, not usernames, and preserves the existing account's username,
password credentials, permissions, boards, settings and API keys. Password
credentials are retained but cannot be used while only OIDC is enabled.
To complete linking:
- Before deploying Authentik-only login, back up
/data/homarr/appdata, then sign in with the local administrator account and ensurejay's email exactly matches the intended Authentik user's. - Independently verify ownership of that email before setting the Authentik
user's
email_verifiedattribute to booleantrue, not string"true". The existing email scope mapping requires this before issuingemail_verified: true; do not mark every user's email verified. - Preserve or transfer anything owned by the duplicate OIDC account, then
delete only that duplicate through Homarr's user management. Do not delete
jay. An existing OIDC link otherwise continues using the duplicate. - Confirm Authentik login links to
jaywith administrator access and the existing boards and permissions before disabling password login. If linking still needs setup, temporarily useAUTH_PROVIDERS=credentials,oidcand redeploy. Once working, pull/redeploy withAUTH_PROVIDERS=oidc.
The linking setting applies to all matching password accounts, not just jay.
Only trusted administrators should mark Authentik emails verified. Password login
is disabled in the current Compose configuration; successful deployment and
account linking have not been confirmed. For recovery if Authentik is unavailable,
temporarily restore AUTH_PROVIDERS=credentials,oidc and redeploy Homarr.
That recovery setting bypasses Authentik MFA and application-access policies
for password logins. Keep SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY unchanged.
Homarr also has a read-only Docker socket proxy on an internal docker-api
network. Only the proxy mounts /var/run/docker.sock; its API port is not
published or connected to Traefik. Homarr's Jupiter endpoint permits inventory
and logs, while the proxy blocks writes (POST=0). Container lifecycle controls
are disabled. Redeploy the whole stack to create the proxy alongside Homarr.
Forward-auth
Backrest (backups.umbra.mom), Notes, Prowlarr, Radarr and Sonarr retain
proxy-based protection. Their routers attach authentik@docker:
Traefik -> http://authentik-server:9000/outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/traefik
The blueprint now includes a sixth forward_single provider for
qbittorrent.umbra.mom, with a direct jay user binding and the shared MFA flow.
The owner confirms its public UI and both authentication layers are working
on 2026-10-26. This confirmation is specific to qBittorrent, not proof that the
broader per-user access migration is complete. qBittorrent retains its own password login, and internal Arr API
connections do not pass through Authentik. See Local downloads.
The embedded-outpost blueprint lists six forward_single providers, each with an
explicit external host and empty skip_path_regex. A priority-1000 router
on those hosts sends /outpost.goauthentik.io/ directly to Authentik,
bypassing forward-auth so callbacks can complete.
trustForwardHeader=true; forwarded response headers:
X-authentik-username, X-authentik-groups, X-authentik-entitlements,
X-authentik-email, X-authentik-name, X-authentik-uid, X-authentik-jwt,
X-authentik-meta-jwks, X-authentik-meta-outpost, X-authentik-meta-provider,
X-authentik-meta-app, X-authentik-meta-version
Forward-auth applies only to attached routers. Authentik is not a global gate for every service, directly published port, SSH connection or API token.
State / secrets
| Host path | Container use |
|---|---|
/data/authentik/postgres |
PostgreSQL /var/lib/postgresql/data; identity, policy and MFA state |
/data/authentik/data |
Server + worker /data; persistent files |
/data/authentik/blueprints |
Worker /blueprints/custom:ro; host copy of repository blueprint |
Stack variable overrides/secrets are managed in Portainer; Compose retains non-secret configuration. Required Authentik stack secrets:
AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY
AUTHENTIK_DB_PASSWORD
OIDC_BESZEL_SECRET
OIDC_DOZZLE_SECRET
OIDC_GITEA_SECRET
OIDC_HOMARR_SECRET
OIDC_IMMICH_SECRET
OIDC_PAPERLESS_SECRET
OIDC_PORTAINER_SECRET
OIDC_WARDROWBE_SECRET
Client secrets are independently generated plaintext credentials, not old
Authelia password hashes. The worker passes them to blueprint !Env entries.
Keep each provider secret matched to its application configuration:
Homarr uses OIDC_HOMARR_SECRET, Dozzle uses DOZZLE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, Paperless
PAPERLESS_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, and Wardrowbe WARDROWBE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET.
Other clients store provider configuration in their databases/UIs.
Public Traefik routing defaults off (AUTHENTIK_PUBLIC_ROUTING=false) for
private initial setup; enable only after securing the administrator account.
The owner reports public deployment complete; this default is not deployed state.
See deployment for the configuration surfaces and order.
/data/authentik and Portainer state are included in
Backrest. Backups stop Authentik server/worker and PostgreSQL;
new OIDC logins and forward-auth access are unavailable during that stop.
Recovery remains untested, with no independent admin/MFA or stack-secret
recovery arrangement; only the restic key has independent custody.
Retention/deletion of retired /data/authelia data is unconfirmed.
GitHub repository access uses a PAT; host SSH keys and tunnel credential files
are separate from stack environment variables.