187 lines
6.4 KiB
Markdown
187 lines
6.4 KiB
Markdown
# Reference Monitors
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The reference monitor is an abstract concept
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> An access control concept that refers to an abstract machine that mediates all access to objects by subjects
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- Must be tamper proof
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- Must *always be invoked* when access to an object is required
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- Must be small enough to be verifiable / subject to analysis to ensure correctness
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##### Placement
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- Can be placed anywhere within the system
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- Hardware - dedicated registers for defining privileges
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- Operating system kernel - virtual machine hyper-visor
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- Operating system - Windows security reference monitor
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- Services layer - `JVM`, `.NET`
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- Application layer - Firewalls
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Reference monitors could be placed in a variety of locations relative to the program being run
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The last example where the program contains its own reference monitor, as found in Windows XP, is a terrible idea - it leaves permissions down to the developer.
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###### Lower is better
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- Using a reference monitor or other security features at a lower level means:
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- We can **assure** a higher degree of security
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- Usually **simple structures** to implement
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- Reduced performance **overheads**
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- Has to be extremely quick as many calls will be made
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- Fewer layer below attack possibilities
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- However
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- Access control decisions are far removed from applications
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#### OS Integrity
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- The operating system
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- Arbitrates access requests
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- Is itself a resource that must be accessed
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- This is a conflict, we want to use the OS but not mess with it
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> Users must not be able to modify the operating system
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- Modes of operation
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- Defines which actions are permitted in which mode e.g. system calls, machine instructions, I/O
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- Controlled Invocation
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- Allows us to execute privileged instructions safely, before returning to user code
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We must distinguish computations done on behalf of:
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- The OS
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- The user
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A status flag within the CPU allows the OS to operate in different modes
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In practice, Windows and Unix only use Ring 0&3 to save on overhead
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### Controlled Invocation
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- Many functions are helf at kernel level, but are quite reasonably called from within user level code
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- Network and File IO
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- Memory allocation
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- Halting the CPU (at shutdown only)
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- We need a mechanism to transfer safely between kernel mode (ring 0) and user mode (ring 3)
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> We don’t actually perform privileged operations, we asking the operating system to perform them for us - The operating system can refuse to do it
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##### Interrupts
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- Exceptions or Interrupts
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- In many ways is the hardware equivalent to a software exception - not always bad
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- Handled by an interrupt handler which resolves the issue and returns to the original code
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Processing an Interrupt
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- Given an interrupt, the CPU will switch execution to location given in an interrupt descriptor table
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#### Descriptors and Selectors
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- Descriptors hold information on crucial system objects like kernel structure locations
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- Descriptors are held in descriptor tables
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- Contain a Descriptor Privilege Level (DPL)
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- Descriptors are indexed by selectors
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- Loaded when required (jump calls)
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- The CPU protects the kernel by checking the Current Privilege Level (CPL) when a Selector is loaded
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##### Interrupt Gates
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- The code segment (CS) register in x86 CPUs has 2-bits reserved for the Current Privilege Level (CPL)
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- Descriptors that have a privilege level higher than where they point are called gates
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- Since these descriptors are created by the kernel, they offer a secure means of entry into ring 0
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###### Modern Kernels
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- Intel introduced the `sysenter` and `sysexit` operations with the Pentium II
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- performs with much less overhead
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We got immediately in to ring 0
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However where we go next is dictated by the `sysenter` pointer, users cannot write to `sysenter`
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#### Patching the Kernel
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- If you can run custom PL 0 code, you can insert your own handler - **Rootkit**
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## Memory Protection
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- A process is a program being executed currently
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- Important unit of control
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- Exists in its own address space
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- Communicates with other processes via the OS
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- Separation for security
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- A thread is a strand of execution within a process
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- Share a common address space
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- Segmentation - divides data into logical units
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- Good for security
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- Challenging memory management
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- Not used much in modern OSs
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- Modern OSs only have two segments, one for user space, the other for kernel space
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- Paging - divides memory into pages of equal size
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- Efficient memory management
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- Less good for access control
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- Extremely common in modern OSs
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##### Page Tables
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- All processes see an individual linear address space
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- Page tables map from a linear address space to the physical address space
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###### Meltdown
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- In most operating systems, the entire kernel is stored in the upper address space
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- Pages in this area are flagged as supervisor, and cannot be access outside ring 0
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- Meltdown is an exploit that allows us to read this privileged memory
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- We do this using a *side-channel*
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- In Intel CPUs, it’s common to speculatively evaluate code prior reaching it
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- E.g. conditionals
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- **Significant** speed up
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- No harm done, changes are just rolled back
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- But the **cache isn’t rolled back**
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- This is called side-channelling and cache timing
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```java
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...
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w = illegal_instruction;
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x = memory[data * 4096];
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...
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```
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- When the CPU runs this code, it will take a significant amount of time to determine that `w` shouldn’t be run, however by that point the speculative code has run `memory[data*4096]`.
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- We won’t see the result as it’ll be discarded once it is discovered `w` was an illegal instruction, although it will appear in cache
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- When all the cache is loaded, one page will load significantly quicker than others as it was loaded during speculative running.
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###### Attack steps
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1. Flush the cache
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2. CPU speculatively evaluates our read using *data*
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3. Read all pages pointed to by `memory[]` and time it
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4. Page 117 was quicker
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- Meltdown attempts to read a value from kernel memory
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- Read from kernel
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- Mask out single bit
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- Access user memory at that location
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- If we repeat we can read all memory in kernel space
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