6.7 KiB
6.7 KiB
schema_version, id, type, scope, sensitivity, last_reviewed, sources, related, update_triggers, unknowns
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| 1 | home-server.authentication | reference |
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private-infrastructure | 2026-10-27 |
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Authentication
- Deployed: Authentik replaces Authelia; portal
https://auth.umbra.mom. - Repository intent, deployment unconfirmed: direct per-user access and Homarr account linking.
- Backend: server + worker + PostgreSQL 16 (
authentikDB/user). - Blueprint:
stacks/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml; host copy must be applied separately. - MFA:
jupiter-app-authorization; TOTP/WebAuthn; setup if absent; five-minute reuse. - Proxy transport/trust: Networking.
Per-user application access
- All 15 applications bind existing user
jayat order0;policy_engine_mode: any. - Add others under Policy / Group / User Bindings: enabled, non-negated User binding, order
10+. Unassigned users are denied; manual higher-order bindings survive reapplication. - Blueprint replaces custom
admins,development,clientsgroups; does not create users or change passwords/MFA/app-native roles. - Keep Jay in the built-in superuser group (
authentik Admins); application admission is not administration. - Before applying: back up Authentik, verify Jay's superuser membership, redeploy Trek's username-based admin mapping, copy/apply the host blueprint, assign retained users.
- Revoke existing application sessions/API keys separately when removing access.
Native OIDC
- Confidential authorization-code clients; strict callbacks; shared MFA flow.
- Issuer:
https://auth.umbra.mom/application/o/<client-id>/.
| Client ID | Host under umbra.mom |
Configuration |
|---|---|---|
beszel |
beszel |
Database/UI provider; password-disable flag in Compose |
dozzle |
logs |
Compose OIDC; dozzle_roles: ["none"]; read-only Docker proxy |
gitea |
gitea |
Database/UI source; login required for linking; auto-registration disabled |
homarr |
Apex | Compose OIDC; verified-email linking |
immich |
photos |
Database/UI OAuth; web + mobile callbacks |
paperless |
paperless |
Compose allauth/OIDC; PKCE; signups disabled |
portainer |
portainer, portainer.local |
Database/UI OAuth; both callback hosts |
trek |
holidays |
Compose; preferred_username == jay grants app admin |
wardrowbe |
wardrobe |
Compose frontend/backend/workers |
- Beszel/Paperless retain migration-safe local-login defaults; deployed overrides unconfirmed.
- OIDC does not synchronise native app roles or prove local login disabled.
- Email mapping emits
email_verifiedonly for an existing email with explicit booleantrue.
Homarr
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Provider / login | jupiter-homarr; AUTH_PROVIDERS=oidc |
| Callback | https://umbra.mom/api/auth/callback/oidc |
| Scopes | openid email profile |
| Shared secret | OIDC_HOMARR_SECRET in Homarr + Authentik |
| Linking | AUTH_OIDC_ENABLE_DANGEROUS_CREDENTIALS_LINKING=true |
- Linking matches email, not username; applies to all matching password accounts.
- Preserve
SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY; password credentials remain stored but unusable with OIDC-only login.
- Back up
/data/homarr/appdata; ensure existingjayemail matches the intended identity. - Independently verify ownership, then set that user's
email_verifiedto booleantrue; never mark all users verified. - Preserve/transfer duplicate-account data, then delete only the duplicate OIDC account, not
jay; an existing link otherwise wins. - Confirm login reaches
jay, admin permissions and existing boards before disabling credentials. Temporarily useAUTH_PROVIDERS=credentials,oidcif needed.
- Credential fallback bypasses Authentik MFA/access policy for password logins.
- Internal
docker-apiproxy: only proxy mounts socket; no published API/Traefik attachment; inventory/logs allowed,POST=0, lifecycle controls disabled. Redeploy the whole stack.
Forward-auth
- Protected apps: Backrest (
backups), Notes, Prowlarr, Radarr, Sonarr, qBittorrent. - Router middleware:
authentik@docker;trustForwardHeader=true. - Endpoint:
http://authentik-server:9000/outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/traefik. - Six embedded
forward_singleproviders; explicit external hosts, emptyskip_path_regex. - Priority 1000 callback router:
/outpost.goauthentik.io/goes directly to Authentik, bypassing forward-auth. - qBittorrent keeps native login; internal Arr API traffic bypasses this browser gate.
- Only attached routers are protected; published ports, SSH and API tokens are separate boundaries.
Forwarded response headers:
X-authentik-username, X-authentik-groups, X-authentik-entitlements,
X-authentik-email, X-authentik-name, X-authentik-uid, X-authentik-jwt,
X-authentik-meta-jwks, X-authentik-meta-outpost, X-authentik-meta-provider,
X-authentik-meta-app, X-authentik-meta-version
State / secrets
| Host path | Container use |
|---|---|
/data/authentik/postgres |
PostgreSQL /var/lib/postgresql/data |
/data/authentik/data |
Server + worker /data |
/data/authentik/blueprints |
Worker /blueprints/custom:ro |
authentik-data: internal DB/server/worker network; worker also usesauthentik-egress, server usestraefik. Internal DB network does not imply full egress isolation.- Secret inventory:
stacks/authentik/.env.example; values in Portainer, consumed through!Env. Do not reuse Authelia hashes as client secrets. - Match provider/application credentials: Homarr
OIDC_HOMARR_SECRET; DozzleDOZZLE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET; PaperlessPAPERLESS_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET; WardrowbeWARDROWBE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET. - Initial setup:
AUTHENTIK_PUBLIC_ROUTING=false, SSH-forwarded127.0.0.1:9000; secure admin/MFA before public routing, prove OIDC before disabling local logins. - Backup coverage, login downtime and credential recovery: Backups.