11 KiB
schema_version, id, type, scope, sensitivity, last_reviewed, sources, related, update_triggers, unknowns
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| 1 | home-server.authentication | reference |
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private-infrastructure | 2026-10-18 |
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Authentication
Authentik replaces Authelia. The owner wanted native OIDC rather than only forward-auth, with three access groups separating server administration, development tools and client-facing services. The owner reports the migration fully deployed as of 2026-10-16 and Authelia retired. Homarr OIDC login was reported working on 2026-10-18; linking to the existing account is configured in the repository but has not been confirmed successful. Configuration details below are repository evidence, not live inspection.
| Component | Configuration |
|---|---|
| Portal | https://auth.umbra.mom |
| Identity service | Authentik server + worker; image 2026.8.4 |
| Database | PostgreSQL 16; database/user authentik |
| Configuration | stacks/authentik/blueprints/jupiter.yaml; worker-mounted custom blueprint |
| Application MFA | jupiter-app-authorization; TOTP or WebAuthn; prompts for setup if none configured |
| Recent MFA | Five-minute reuse threshold avoids an immediate duplicate challenge |
| Host setup access | Loopback 127.0.0.1:9000 -> server 9000 |
Access groups
Owner terminology maps to the blueprint's exact group names:
| Intended group | Authentik group | Purpose / applications |
|---|---|---|
| Admin | admins |
Owner only; server health/operations: Backrest, Beszel, Dozzle, Notes, Prowlarr, Radarr, Sonarr |
| Developers | development |
Development services: Gitea, Portainer |
| Clients | clients |
Useful end-user services: Immich, Paperless, Wardrowbe |
Each application in the access-group table has an enabled group binding; policy_engine_mode: all;
binding failure result is false. All three groups have is_superuser: false:
admins application access is not Authentik superuser status.
No group hierarchy or membership assignment is declared by this blueprint.
Membership in admins alone does not grant the development/client applications;
users needing multiple categories need the corresponding memberships.
Actual deployed membership assignments were not supplied.
Native OIDC
Each client uses a confidential authorization-code provider, strict redirect URIs,
per-provider issuer and the shared application-MFA authorization flow.
Issuer pattern: https://auth.umbra.mom/application/o/<client-id>/.
| Client ID | Application hostname | Integration configuration |
|---|---|---|
beszel |
beszel.umbra.mom |
Database/UI provider; password-auth disable flag in Compose |
dozzle |
logs.umbra.mom |
Compose OIDC settings; no forward-auth middleware |
gitea |
gitea.umbra.mom |
Database/UI authentication source; Compose requires login for account linking and disables automatic registration |
homarr |
umbra.mom |
Compose OIDC settings; local password login retained; verified-email linking to existing password accounts enabled |
immich |
photos.umbra.mom |
Database/UI OAuth settings; web and mobile callbacks registered |
paperless |
paperless.umbra.mom |
Compose OpenID Connect/allauth configuration; PKCE enabled; signups disabled |
portainer |
portainer.umbra.mom, portainer.local.umbra.mom |
Database/UI OAuth settings; both callback hosts registered |
wardrowbe |
wardrobe.umbra.mom |
Compose OIDC settings for frontend and backend/workers |
Dozzle's custom profile mapping emits dozzle_roles: ["none"] for admins
members and [] otherwise; application access is separately restricted to
admins. The email mapping asserts email_verified only when the user has
an email and their email_verified attribute is explicitly true.
OIDC integration does not prove local password login is disabled or application roles are synchronized. Beszel and Paperless retain migration-safe local-login defaults in Compose; deployed overrides and account-linking details were not supplied. Application permissions and existing sessions remain app-managed.
Homarr
Homarr uses native OIDC, not a Traefik forward-auth gate. Its Authentik provider
is jupiter-homarr, with the shared application-MFA flow.
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Login providers | AUTH_PROVIDERS=credentials,oidc |
| Issuer | https://auth.umbra.mom/application/o/homarr/ |
| Client ID / display name | homarr / Authentik |
| Callback | https://umbra.mom/api/auth/callback/oidc (strict match) |
| Requested scopes | openid email profile |
| Client secret | OIDC_HOMARR_SECRET in both the Homarr and Authentik stack environments |
| Existing-account linking | AUTH_OIDC_ENABLE_DANGEROUS_CREDENTIALS_LINKING=true |
An OIDC login initially created a separate user instead of signing into the
existing jay password account. Linking is now enabled in Compose; it matches
email addresses, not usernames, and preserves the existing account's username,
password login, permissions, boards, settings and API keys.
To complete linking:
- Back up
/data/homarr/appdata, then sign in with the local administrator account and ensurejay's email exactly matches the intended Authentik user's. - Independently verify ownership of that email before setting the Authentik
user's
email_verifiedattribute to booleantrue, not string"true". The existing email scope mapping requires this before issuingemail_verified: true; do not mark every user's email verified. - Preserve or transfer anything owned by the duplicate OIDC account, then
delete only that duplicate through Homarr's user management. Do not delete
jay. An existing OIDC link otherwise continues using the duplicate. - Pull/redeploy Homarr in Portainer to apply the linking setting, sign out,
then sign in using Authentik and confirm the session uses
jaywith the existing boards and permissions.
The linking setting applies to all matching password accounts, not just jay.
Only trusted administrators should mark Authentik emails verified. Local
password login remains available for recovery and bypasses Authentik MFA and
application-access policies. Keep SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY unchanged.
Forward-auth
Backrest (backups.umbra.mom), Notes, Prowlarr, Radarr and Sonarr retain
proxy-based protection. Their routers attach authentik@docker:
Traefik -> http://authentik-server:9000/outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/traefik
The embedded outpost serves five forward_single providers, each with an
explicit external host and empty skip_path_regex. A priority-1000 router
on those hosts sends /outpost.goauthentik.io/ directly to Authentik,
bypassing forward-auth so callbacks can complete.
trustForwardHeader=true; forwarded response headers:
X-authentik-username, X-authentik-groups, X-authentik-entitlements,
X-authentik-email, X-authentik-name, X-authentik-uid, X-authentik-jwt,
X-authentik-meta-jwks, X-authentik-meta-outpost, X-authentik-meta-provider,
X-authentik-meta-app, X-authentik-meta-version
Forward-auth applies only to attached routers. Authentik is not a global gate for every service, directly published port, SSH connection or API token.
State / secrets
| Host path | Container use |
|---|---|
/data/authentik/postgres |
PostgreSQL /var/lib/postgresql/data; identity, policy and MFA state |
/data/authentik/data |
Server + worker /data; persistent files |
/data/authentik/blueprints |
Worker /blueprints/custom:ro; host copy of repository blueprint |
Stack variable overrides/secrets are managed in Portainer; Compose retains non-secret configuration. Required Authentik stack secrets:
AUTHENTIK_SECRET_KEY
AUTHENTIK_DB_PASSWORD
OIDC_BESZEL_SECRET
OIDC_DOZZLE_SECRET
OIDC_GITEA_SECRET
OIDC_HOMARR_SECRET
OIDC_IMMICH_SECRET
OIDC_PAPERLESS_SECRET
OIDC_PORTAINER_SECRET
OIDC_WARDROWBE_SECRET
Client secrets are independently generated plaintext credentials, not old
Authelia password hashes. The worker passes them to blueprint !Env entries.
Keep each provider secret matched to its application configuration:
Homarr uses OIDC_HOMARR_SECRET, Dozzle uses DOZZLE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, Paperless
PAPERLESS_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, and Wardrowbe WARDROWBE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET.
Other clients store provider configuration in their databases/UIs.
Public Traefik routing defaults off (AUTHENTIK_PUBLIC_ROUTING=false) for
private initial setup; enable only after securing the administrator account.
The owner reports public deployment complete; this default is not deployed state.
See deployment for the configuration surfaces and order.
/data/authentik and Portainer state are included in
Backrest. Backups stop Authentik server/worker and PostgreSQL;
new OIDC logins and forward-auth access are unavailable during that stop.
Recovery remains untested, with no independent admin/MFA or stack-secret
recovery arrangement; only the restic key has independent custody.
Retention/deletion of retired /data/authelia data is unconfirmed.
GitHub repository access uses a PAT; host SSH keys and tunnel credential files
are separate from stack environment variables.