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notes/docs/home-server/backups.md
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---
schema_version: 1
id: home-server.backups
type: reference
scope: [jupiter, backrest, restic, google-drive, recovery]
sensitivity: private-infrastructure
last_reviewed: "2026-10-27"
sources:
- kind: live-inspection
reference: "Backrest plan and read-only SSD mount verified after PostgreSQL cutover 2026-10-27; seven original application paths plus four new SSD database paths"
- kind: owner-report
reference: "Plan/hooks/key custody 2026-10-06; six-directory plan and Authentik names 2026-10-16; downloads not backed up 2026-10-26; no restore evidence"
- kind: repository
repository: jupiter-stacks
revision: d09df456ad331b8beb9a40615114ea8aae2dced5
paths: [stacks/backrest/docker-compose.yml, stacks/authentik/docker-compose.yml, stacks/wardrowbe/docker-compose.yml]
related: [home-server.storage, home-server.downloads, home-server.authentication, home-server.operations]
update_triggers: [backup-plan-change, destination-change, hook-change, credential-change, restore-test]
unknowns: [last-successful-backup-and-check, google-drive-repository-path, measured-rpo-and-rto]
---
# Backups
| Setting | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Engine / plan | Backrest + restic / `jupiter-backup` |
| Repository | `jayo60013-gdrive`; Google Drive account `jayo60013` |
| Schedule | `0 3 * * *`, UTC |
| Retention | `policyKeepLastN: 4`: four **snapshots**, not days |
| Key custody | iCloud password app; only independently held recovery secret |
| Evidence | No successful backup/integrity evidence supplied; restore never exercised |
## Coverage
- Backrest sees `/data` as `/userdata:ro`; these seven application directories are selected:
`authentik`, `gitea`, `paperless-ngx`, `portainer`, `trek`, `vaultwarden`, `wardrowbe`.
- `/home/jay/data` is exposed read-only as `/ssddata`. The plan additionally selects
`/ssddata/{authentik/postgres,gitea/db,paperless-ngx/postgres,wardrowbe/postgres}`.
- Case-insensitive exclusions: `/userdata/gitea/gitea/packages`, `/userdata/wardrowbe/redis`,
and stale pre-SSD copies `/userdata/{authentik/postgres,gitea/db,paperless-ngx/postgres,wardrowbe/postgres}`.
- CTQ's new `/ssddata/ctq/postgres` is **not** in the scheduled plan; the migration did not extend its previous backup coverage. Private logical dumps for all five databases are retained on the SSD, not off-host backups.
- `excludes: []`; CLI `--skip-if-unchanged` despite plan `skipIfUnchanged: false`; unchanged runs may create no snapshot.
### Local-downloads recovery gap
- [qBittorrent config/defaults and AirVPN keys](downloads.md#state-and-redeployment) are **not backed up** as of 2026-10-26.
- Keep address/country/reserved-port configuration recoverable alongside encrypted keys; never put key values here.
- Torrent payloads/media are also outside the plan. Retired Ultra.cc is not a recovery source.
- Backrest's Google Drive/rclone dependency is separate from the removed seedbox mount.
## Consistency hooks
- Cold filesystem copies, not DB dumps; stop timeout **120s**, ordered chains use `&&`.
- Default failure: `ON_ERROR_FATAL`. Portainer/Wardrowbe/Authentik **restart** failures: `ON_ERROR_IGNORE`.
| Service | `SNAPSHOT_START` stop order | Restart order / event |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Paperless | `paperless` -> `paperless_db` | DB -> app; `SNAPSHOT_END`, `SNAPSHOT_ERROR` |
| Gitea | `gitea_runner` -> `gitea` -> `gitea_db` | DB -> app -> runner; end/error |
| Vaultwarden | `vaultwarden` | Start; `SNAPSHOT_END`, `ANY_ERROR` |
| Portainer | `portainer` | Start; end/error; failure ignored |
| Wardrowbe | frontend/backend/worker/image-worker together -> postgres/redis | DB/cache -> readiness waits -> apps; end/error; failure ignored |
| Authentik | `authentik-server`, `authentik-worker` -> `authentik-postgresql` | DB -> readiness wait -> server/worker; end/error; failure ignored |
- Wardrowbe names use `wardrowbe-` prefix; hooks precede Authentik's in the supplied plan.
- Waits: `pg_isready -U wardrowbe -d wardrowbe`, `redis-cli ping`; Authentik `pg_isready -U authentik -d authentik`; 2s polling, no explicit deadline.
- Paperless broker stays running; Paperless/Gitea use `docker start` without DB readiness waits.
- Preserve deployed Authentik worker/DB names or update hooks; only server has explicit Compose name.
- Authentik stops interrupt new OIDC/proxy logins, including Backrest access.
- **Backup completion does not prove service recovery**; ignored restart errors can leave apps down. [Notifications](operations.md#observability) do not prove integrity/readiness.
## Backrest state
| Host path | Container path |
| --- | --- |
| `/data/backrest/data` | `/data` |
| `/data/backrest/config` | `/config`; `config.json` plan/repository settings |
| `/data/backrest/rclone` | `/root/.config/rclone` |
| `/home/jay/data/backrest/cache` | `/cache` |
| `/data/backrest/restore` | `/restore` |
| `/home/jay/data` | `/ssddata:ro`; selected PostgreSQL directories only |
| `/var/run/docker.sock` | Same path; lifecycle hooks |
## Recovery limits
- No supplied coverage for Backrest config, Traefik, OS/host config, Mercury, named volumes or SSD model/cache paths. Wardrowbe Redis explicitly excluded.
- No independent Git/PAT, stack-secret, Authentik admin/MFA or Google Drive/rclone recovery arrangement; restic key alone cannot retrieve backups.
- Proposed, **not implemented**: sanitised host/bootstrap config in private Git; encrypted off-host credential/config archive; independently usable access/decryption instructions.
- Restore/retrieval must work without Jupiter or Portainer; recovering Portainer's DB cannot bootstrap access to an inaccessible backup.
- `/restore` is on the same RAID array, not an independent copy. RPO/RTO and full-host recovery order remain unproven.