11 KiB
schema_version, id, type, scope, sensitivity, last_reviewed, sources, related, update_triggers, unknowns
| schema_version | id | type | scope | sensitivity | last_reviewed | sources | related | update_triggers | unknowns | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | home-server.mercury | reference |
|
private-infrastructure | 2026-10-26 |
|
|
|
|
Mercury VPS
Host / subscription
| Field | Configuration |
|---|---|
| Provider | Fasthosts; UK data centre |
| Role / OS hostname | Mercury / my-vps |
| Plan | 1-1-10; KVM virtual machine |
| CPU | 1 vCore; reported AMD EPYC-Milan @ 2.00 GHz |
| RAM | 1 GB plan; guest reports 864.37 MiB |
| Disk | 10 GB NVMe SSD plan; guest root ext4, 9.64 GiB |
| OS | Debian GNU/Linux 13 (trixie); x86_64 |
| Kernel | 6.12.85+deb13-amd64 |
| Swap | Disabled |
| Public interface | ens6; 185.230.217.66/32 |
| WireGuard | Server 10.0.0.1/24; Jupiter peer 10.0.0.2/24 |
| Created | 2026-03-01 20:48:51; timezone unconfirmed |
| Payment | GBP 10.00 prepaid for one year; renewal terms unconfirmed |
Capacities distinguish provider allocation from guest-visible values.
Ingress
nginx runs directly in the VM, not in Docker; nginx and WireGuard are apt-managed. Mercury provides static public IPv4 ingress because Jupiter's home connection uses CGNAT. Residential-IP exposure is avoided by design.
| Hostname | Upstream |
|---|---|
umbra.mom, *.umbra.mom |
https://10.0.0.2:443 over WireGuard |
gitea.umbra.mom |
Same; dedicated registry location /v2/ |
john.gatward.dev, samstoreymusic.com |
https://10.0.0.2:443 |
uptime.umbra.mom |
http://127.0.0.1:3001 |
- HTTP -> HTTPS:
301; unmatched default server:418. - TLS terminates at nginx; upstream HTTPS terminates again at Jupiter Traefik.
- Upstream certificate verification disabled:
proxy_ssl_verify off. - Certificates:
/etc/letsencrypt/live/<domain>/{fullchain.pem,privkey.pem};umbra.momcertificate also serves its subdomains. - Preserves
Host; setsX-Real-IP,X-Forwarded-For,X-Forwarded-Proto; forwards WebSocket upgrade headers. - Gitea
/v2/: unlimited request body; proxy timeouts900s.
Monitoring / notifications
Mercury is now monitored by the Beszel hub on Jupiter, confirmed by the owner on 2026-10-26. The following Mercury alerts are configured:
| Alert | Trigger |
|---|---|
| CPU usage | Above 90% for 10 minutes |
| Memory usage | Above 90% for 10 minutes |
| Failed Services | Any failed systemd service |
These are deployed alert settings, not proposed additions. Beszel's Failed Services rule detects failed systemd units, not every error-level journal entry. Alert settings are stored in the Beszel hub UI/database, not the agent Compose file. Beszel cannot deliver these alerts while Jupiter or its hub is down.
Uptime Kuma runs on Mercury, served at https://uptime.umbra.mom through
the local upstream http://127.0.0.1:3001. Its current monitoring scope is
only the health of the WireGuard tunnel and whether Jupiter is online.
It notifies Jay on Discord when either is down, using the Jupiter
Discord server's #uptimekuma-alerts channel. Coverage confirmed by the owner
on 2026-10-26; notification receipt previously confirmed on 2026-10-23.
It does not currently monitor individual containers or application health.
The supplied ~/uptime-kuma.sh is now represented by
mercury/stacks/uptime-kuma/docker-compose.yml in jupiter-stacks.
It retains image louislam/uptime-kuma:2-slim, container name uptime-kuma,
restart policy unless-stopped, loopback port 3001, and bind mount
/opt/uptime-kuma:/app/data. Limits remain 300 MiB RAM and 0.5 CPU, with
10 MiB / 3-file log rotation (Compose explicitly selects json-file).
The adjacent README documents a stopped-data backup and migration into the
Mercury Portainer environment. Migration has not been confirmed; the repository
change alone does not replace the running container. nginx remains host-managed.
Exact probe types, targets and alert timing have not been recorded. A failed check over WireGuard can indicate a tunnel/path failure rather than a powered-off Jupiter. Mercury monitors independently of Jupiter, but cannot report its own complete outage through this instance; an external monitor is not yet confirmed. See Observability for container-alerting guidance.
Firewall / fail2ban
- UFW-managed iptables: INPUT/FORWARD
DROP; OUTPUTACCEPT. - UFW allows TCP
22,80,443; UDP80,443,51820. - Docker forwarding has separate rules; INPUT policy alone does not define container exposure.
- Fail2ban version:
1.1.0; three active jails:nginx-botsearch,nginx-http-auth,sshd. Confirmed from owner-supplied CLI output on 2026-10-26.
Read-only commands to check the installed version and active jails:
sudo fail2ban-client version
sudo fail2ban-client status
Effective jail settings from owner-supplied CLI output on 2026-10-26:
| Jail | Retry threshold (maxretry) |
Detection window (findtime) |
Ban duration (bantime) |
IP/network exemptions (ignoreip) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
sshd |
5 | 600 seconds (10 minutes) | 600 seconds (10 minutes) | None |
nginx-http-auth |
3 | 600 seconds (10 minutes) | 600 seconds (10 minutes) | None |
nginx-botsearch |
2 | 600 seconds (10 minutes) | 3600 seconds (1 hour) | None |
These thresholds count filter-matched failures within the detection window,
not arbitrary requests. No IP/network is explicitly exempt through ignoreip
in any of the three jails; other ignore mechanisms have not been inspected.
Ban escalation settings and enforcement action details have not yet been
recorded. Avoid deliberate failed SSH login
tests without a recovery route: the administrator's IP has no ignoreip
exemption.
Fail2ban log sources / enforcement
Owner-supplied runtime output on 2026-10-26 confirms:
| Jail | Monitored source | Configured action |
|---|---|---|
sshd |
systemd journal: _SYSTEMD_UNIT=ssh.service + _COMM=sshd; no log file monitored |
nftables |
nginx-http-auth |
/var/log/nginx/error.log; no journal match set |
nftables |
nginx-botsearch |
/var/log/nginx/access.log; no journal match set |
nftables |
The + in the SSH journal match is an OR: entries matching ssh.service or
the sshd command are selected. All three jails use the nftables action;
the action name alone does not establish the exact blocked ports, chains or
IPv4/IPv6 coverage. Those action parameters have not yet been inspected.
Fail2ban persistent configuration
Owner-supplied non-comment configuration on 2026-10-26:
/etc/fail2ban/jail.local:
[nginx-botsearch]
enabled = true
port = http,https
filter = nginx-botsearch
logpath = /var/log/nginx/access.log
maxretry = 2
findtime = 600
bantime = 3600
[nginx-http-auth]
enabled = true
filter = nginx-http-auth
port = http,https
logpath = /var/log/nginx/error.log
maxretry = 3
/etc/fail2ban/jail.d/defaults-debian.conf:
[DEFAULT]
banaction = nftables
banaction_allports = nftables[type=allports]
[sshd]
backend = systemd
journalmatch = _SYSTEMD_UNIT=ssh.service + _COMM=sshd
enabled = true
The nginx jails explicitly target http,https. Defining
banaction_allports does not establish that any active jail uses all-port
banning. The SSH thresholds and nginx HTTP auth timing in the runtime table
are not explicitly set in these snippets; they are inherited from other
configuration/defaults.
These host configuration files are outside the Docker Compose stacks. Their
backup coverage and any direct edits to jail.conf or filter/action files
have not been confirmed.
Fail2ban logging / history
Owner-supplied runtime settings on 2026-10-26:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
Fail2ban log destination (logtarget) |
/var/log/fail2ban.log |
Persistent database (dbfile) |
/var/lib/fail2ban/fail2ban.sqlite3 |
Database purge age (dbpurgeage) |
86400 seconds (24 hours) |
Start at boot (systemctl is-enabled fail2ban) |
enabled |
The purge age controls cleanup of old database ban history; it is not the ban duration and does not define log-file retention. Log rotation and retained log history have not yet been inspected. The database is not an established long-term event archive, so a future historical ban-count widget must account for cleanup and log rotation rather than treating it as complete history.
Boot enablement does not by itself prove service health or successful enforcement. Current bans can be inspected without changing configuration:
sudo fail2ban-client status sshd
sudo fail2ban-client status nginx-http-auth
sudo fail2ban-client status nginx-botsearch
Rules and versions are supplied snapshots, not live inspection.