--- schema_version: 1 id: home-server.mercury type: reference scope: [mercury, vps, firewall, fail2ban, uptime-kuma] sensitivity: private-infrastructure last_reviewed: "2026-10-30" sources: - kind: owner-report reference: "Hosting/firewall snapshot 2026-10-06; Fail2ban CLI/config and Kuma runtime 2026-10-26" - kind: owner-report reference: "SSH moved to TCP 58250; UFW status verbose after TCP-only web rule change, provider incoming firewall, ss -lntup and docker ps supplied 2026-10-30" - kind: live-inspection reference: "Hostname mercury and nginx 1.26.3 inspected 2026-10-27; firewall/hosting not revalidated" - kind: repository repository: jupiter-stacks revision: working-tree paths: [mercury/stacks/uptime-kuma/docker-compose.yml] related: [home-server.networking, home-server.operations, home-server.backups] update_triggers: [hosting-renewal, vps-resize, os-upgrade, firewall-change, kuma-change] unknowns: [renewal-price-and-date, creation-timestamp-timezone, certificate-renewal-method, mercury-backup-policy, fail2ban-enforcement-details-and-log-retention, docker-firewall-enforcement, sshd-jail-port-after-ssh-move] --- # Mercury VPS ## Host | Setting | Value | | --- | --- | | Provider / plan | Fasthosts UK; KVM `1-1-10` | | CPU / RAM | 1 vCore, AMD EPYC-Milan reported; 1 GB plan / 864.37 MiB guest | | Disk | 10 GB NVMe plan / 9.64 GiB ext4 root; no swap | | OS / kernel | Debian 13 x86_64; `6.12.85+deb13-amd64` | | Hostname | `mercury`; older snapshot: `my-vps` | | Public interface | `ens6`; `185.230.217.66/32` | | Created / payment | `2026-03-01 20:48:51`, timezone unknown; GBP 10 prepaid/year | | Administration | SSH on TCP `58250`: `ssh -p 58250 jay@185.230.217.66`; from Jupiter: `ssh mercury` with `Port 58250` in that host's SSH client configuration; nginx/WireGuard apt-managed | | Certificates | `/etc/letsencrypt/live//{fullchain.pem,privkey.pem}`; renewal method unknown | - Ingress, tunnel addresses and nginx configuration: [Networking](networking.md). - Alert scope, thresholds and Discord destinations: [Operations](operations.md#observability). ## Uptime Kuma runtime - Supplied launch script: `~/uptime-kuma.sh`; Compose replacement in `mercury/stacks/uptime-kuma/docker-compose.yml` is **not confirmed deployed**. - Image `louislam/uptime-kuma:2-slim`; container `uptime-kuma`; restart `unless-stopped`. - Bind `/opt/uptime-kuma:/app/data`; loopback `127.0.0.1:3001`. - Limits: **300 MiB / 0.5 CPU**; `json-file` logs **10 MiB x 3**. - Stop before copying state for migration; preserve the bind directory. nginx stays host-managed. ## Firewall / Fail2ban - Latest owner-supplied `ufw status verbose` snapshot **2026-10-30**: UFW active; public allows for TCP `80,443,58250` and UDP `51820`, each for IPv4 and IPv6. The earlier unqualified `80`/`443` rules have been replaced with TCP-only rules; no port `22` or UDP `80,443` allow remains. - UFW defaults: **deny incoming, allow outgoing, deny routed**; logging on (`low`); new profiles `skip`. Docker forwarding has separate rules and published container ports can bypass UFW INPUT filtering; the UFW defaults alone do not prove Docker port filtering. - Last supplied provider incoming firewall: TCP `80,443,8443,8447,58250`; UDP `51820`, all sources. Removal of `8443,8447` has not been confirmed. This is separate from UFW; traffic must pass both layers. ### Public port policy | Port | Recommendation | Reason | | --- | --- | --- | | TCP `80` | Keep for now | nginx redirects HTTP to HTTPS. Mercury certificate renewal is unconfirmed; HTTP-01 renewal would also require it. Jupiter's DNS-01 setup does not establish Mercury's renewal method. | | TCP `443` | Keep | Public nginx HTTPS ingress, including Uptime Kuma. | | UDP `51820` | Keep | WireGuard carries Mercury-to-Jupiter application traffic. | | TCP `58250` | Keep while public SSH is needed | Current administration port. Restrict source IPs only if stable administrator addresses and recovery access are available. | | TCP `8443,8447` | Remove provider allows | No dependency in the documented ingress or repository configuration; neither has a listener or Docker port publication in the supplied 2026-10-30 output. | | UDP `80,443` | No allowance needed; removed from UFW | Documented nginx uses TCP HTTP/HTTPS, not QUIC/HTTP/3. The supplied provider policy also has no UDP allows for these ports. | Owner-supplied `sudo ss -lntup` and `sudo docker ps --format 'table {{.Names}}\t{{.Ports}}'` output on **2026-10-30** confirms: - nginx listens on IPv4 TCP `80,443`; sshd on IPv4/IPv6 TCP `58250`; WireGuard on IPv4/IPv6 UDP `51820`. No listener on `22,8443,8447` or UDP `80,443`. - `portainer_agent` publishes only `10.0.0.1:9001` over WireGuard; `uptime-kuma` publishes only `127.0.0.1:3001`. Neither requires another public provider allow. - DNS `53`, SMTP `25` and containerd `33999` listen only on loopback. `systemd-resolved` listens on TCP/UDP `5355` (LLMNR) on wildcard addresses; do not add a public allow. UDP `68` is the DHCP client, not an application port to disable. - `beszel-agent` is running but no TCP `45876` listener appears. A running container does not establish monitoring connectivity; inspect its logs and effective listener configuration before treating Beszel as healthy. The TCP-only UFW web rules are confirmed for IPv4 and IPv6. Provider rule removal remains a recommendation, not a confirmed change. Do not close public `58250` until an alternative administration path has been tested with a fresh SSH connection; retain the current session and provider recovery console. Do not open backend ports publicly: Traefik `8081` is on Jupiter over WireGuard; Kuma `3001` is loopback-only; Portainer agent `9001` is bound to Mercury's WireGuard address. Mercury's Beszel agent is intended to listen on TCP `45876`; its rule must be limited to `10.0.0.2` -> `10.0.0.1` over WireGuard, as described in `jupiter-stacks/mercury/stacks/beszel-agent/README.md`. That rule and listener are absent from the supplied snapshots. ### Fail2ban - Fail2ban **1.1.0**, enabled at boot; effective settings from **2026-10-26**: | Jail | Source | Retries / window | Ban | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | `sshd` | journal: `_SYSTEMD_UNIT=ssh.service + _COMM=sshd` | 5 / 600s | 600s | | `nginx-http-auth` | `/var/log/nginx/error.log` | 3 / 600s | 600s | | `nginx-botsearch` | `/var/log/nginx/access.log` | 2 / 600s | 3600s | - All three: action `nftables`; `ignoreip` empty. SSH journal `+` means **OR**. - nginx jails target `http,https`. Action names do not prove blocked chains, ports or IPv6 coverage. - After moving SSH to `58250`, verify the `sshd` jail's effective action targets TCP `58250` (or all ports), not only the default `ssh`/`22`. For a multiport action, set `port = 58250` in the persistent `[sshd]` override and reload Fail2ban; inspect the generated nftables rules to confirm enforcement. This has not been revalidated since the port move. - Persistent overrides: `/etc/fail2ban/jail.local` (nginx filters/paths/retries; botsearch timing) and `jail.d/defaults-debian.conf` (SSH systemd backend/match; nftables defaults). - `banaction_allports=nftables[type=allports]` is defined; active use is unconfirmed. Other timing values are inherited. - Log: `/var/log/fail2ban.log`; DB: `/var/lib/fail2ban/fail2ban.sqlite3`; `dbpurgeage=86400`. - DB purge age is **not** ban duration or log retention; escalation, rotation and config backup remain unknown. - No administrator IP exemption: retain recovery access before testing failed logins. ```sh sudo fail2ban-client version sudo fail2ban-client status sudo fail2ban-client status sshd sudo fail2ban-client status nginx-http-auth sudo fail2ban-client status nginx-botsearch ```