Tidy up
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@@ -14,20 +14,20 @@ Assets could be physical or virtual data
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- Historically systems have been built to serve single users
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- Often only a few highly trusted users were permitted to access a system
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- This makes mistakes made by trusted users still a concern
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- This makes mistakes made by trusted users still a concern
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- Current multi-user systems have completely different security concerns
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##### Modern Computer Security
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- Possibly thousands of users
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- Distributed over wide networks
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- Not all users are inherently trust worthy
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- Not all users are inherently trustworthy
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- More and more things are moving to electronic
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- Requiring protocols to manage them
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- Requiring protocols to manage them
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### Attacks
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- Monetary transaction need security
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- Monetary transactions need security
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This is what most interactions look like and therefore attacks are based on this communication
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@@ -45,13 +45,13 @@ What if the server gets hacked, we can use **hash functions**
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###### Digital Certificates
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However, this can be bypassed if the clients machine is hacked
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However, this can be bypassed if the client’s machine is hacked
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We have to ensure the client is running anti virus software and practices good avoidance.
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We have to ensure the client is running antivirus software and practises good avoidance.
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###### Insider attacks
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To stop this the company must practice good security such as:
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To stop this the company must practise good security such as:
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- Database security Controls
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- File access controls
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@@ -72,31 +72,31 @@ It is often simply an arms race between developers & researchers and malicious u
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- Within organisations, management are responsible for defining security needs
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- Developers implement these policies
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- A concise document explaining the needs is called a *Security Policy*
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- What should be protected?
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- How should we protect it?
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- What should be protected?
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- How should we protect it?
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- UoN security policy
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- https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/dts/security/it-security.aspx
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- https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/dts/security/it-security.aspx
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#### Computer Security
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- Usually defined as three keys areas (**CIA**)
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- Usually defined as three key areas (**CIA**)
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1. Confidentiality
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- Prevention of unauthorised *disclosure* of information
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- This involves unauthorised users reading private or secret information
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- Medical records or credit card details
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- Prevention of unauthorised *disclosure* of information
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- This involves unauthorised users reading private or secret information
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- Medical records or credit card details
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2. Integrity
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- Prevention of unauthorised *modification* of information
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- Also the assurance that data remains *unmodified*
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- Distributed bank transactions or database records
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- Just because we have **integrity**, doesn’t mean we have **authenticity**
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- Can we verify the sender? does it have freshness?
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- Authenticity = Intercity + Freshness
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- Prevention of unauthorised *modification* of information
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- Also the assurance that data remains *unmodified*
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- Distributed bank transactions or database records
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- Just because we have **integrity**, doesn’t mean we have **authenticity**
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- Can we verify the sender? does it have freshness?
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- Authenticity = Integrity + Freshness
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3. Availability
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- Prevention of unauthorised *withholding* of information or resources
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- The property of being accessible is an usable upon demand by an authorised entity
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- In other words prevent DoS attacks
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- e.g. redundant power supplies, firewall packet filtering
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- Prevention of unauthorised *withholding* of information or resources
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- The property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorised entity
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- In other words prevent DoS attacks
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- e.g. redundant power supplies, firewall packet filtering
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#### Accountability
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@@ -109,49 +109,49 @@ It is often simply an arms race between developers & researchers and malicious u
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- Provides unforgeable evidence that someone did something
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- Mostly a legal concept
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- Evidence verifiable by a trusted third party
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- e.g notaries, digital certificates
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- e.g notaries, digital certificates
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- Applies to physical security as well
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- Like key cards
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- Like key cards
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##### The security Dilemma
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> “Security-unaware users have specific security requirements but no security expertise”
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- There is a trade off between security and ease of use
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- There is a trade-off between security and ease of use
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- Increased resource demands
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- Interferes with working patterns
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###### Added complexity
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- Often user experience is place at the forefront of software engineering
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- Often user experience is placed at the forefront of software engineering
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- This is usually not compatible with security
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- Security can be seen as controlling access to information
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- This is hard, we usually control access to data instead
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- Data - a means to represent information
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- Information - an interpretation of that data
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- Data - a means to represent information
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- Information - an interpretation of that data
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- Focusing on data can still leave information vulnerable
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- for example: Mikes criminal record not found
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- vs you do not have permission to access mikes criminal record
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- for example: Mike’s criminal record not found
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- vs you do not have permission to access Mike’s criminal record
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#### Security Design
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- Computer Security is **not** rocket science if:
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- Approached in a systematic, disciplined and well planned manner
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- From the inception / design of a system
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- Approached in a systematic, disciplined and well planned manner
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- From the inception / design of a system
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- However, if added as an afterthought, will often lead to disaster
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- Good security design focuses on these principles
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1. Focus of control
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- In a given application, should the focus of protection mechanisms be:
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- Data - permitted manipulation of data
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- consistency check
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- Operations - permitted invocations
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- Users - permissions for specific users
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2. Complexity vs assurance
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- Would we prefer a simple approach with *high assurance*? or a feature rich environment
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3. Centralised or decentralised controls
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- Should defining and enforcing security be performed by central entity, or be left to individual components in a system
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- **Central entity** - possible bottleneck
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- **Distributed solution** - more efficient, but harder to manage
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4. Layered security
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- We can visualise our security model in layers
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- Each layer protects a boundary, and relies on the security of the layers below
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1. Focus of control
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- In a given application, should the focus of protection mechanisms be:
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- Data - permitted manipulation of data
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- consistency check
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- Operations - permitted invocations
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- Users - permissions for specific users
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2. Complexity vs assurance
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- Would we prefer a simple approach with *high assurance*? or a feature rich environment
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3. Centralised or decentralised controls
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- Should defining and enforcing security be performed by central entity, or be left to individual components in a system
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- **Central entity** - possible bottleneck
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- **Distributed solution** - more efficient, but harder to manage
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4. Layered security
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- We can visualise our security model in layers
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- Each layer protects a boundary, and relies on the security of the layers below
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